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Summary
This dissertation consists of three chapters on the contracting problem
between principal and agents.1 The first two chapters focus on contract
that involves adverse selection problem in the team framework, enriching
the existing literature by suggesting the optimal mechanism in different
model setups. The third chapter analyzes a hierarchical communication
problem within the firm, providing reasons to explain the co-existence of
skip-level communication and open communication observed in reality.
In Chapter one, I have considered the problem of optimal contract when
incentive reporting is not allowed because communication is too costly. In
team problems is it better to reward players based on their individual ef-
forts or should they be rewarded based on joint output? Players know each
other’s types (i.e., productivity) after contracting with the principal while
the principal lacks this information. When efforts are perfect complements,
for rewards based on input the more productive agent tends to put in too
much effort so that part of the effort is wasted as it makes no difference,
on the margin, to team production. In contrast, using an output-based
1All three chapters with the formal analysis have been developed independently by
myself although the materials are based on discussions with my thesis supervisor Pro-
fessor Parimal Bag and committee member Professor Satoru Takahashi, and some of
the results have earlier been presented as joint works with Professor Bag.
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contract, the principal is able to achieve higher profits by avoiding the po-
tential waste under input monitoring. When efforts are perfect substitutes,
input monitoring sometimes dominates output monitoring as the former
encourages team members to put in their best performance instead of free
riding on each other. On the other hand, for significant difference in pro-
ductivity between the high type and low type agents, output monitoring
is a better option as it encourages the more productive agent to apply his
skill knowing well that the low type will free ride. Thus, the results depend
on the distribution and differences of agents’ productivity.
In Chapter two, I have reviewed the work of McAfee and McMillan
(1991). In a team setting subject to both adverse selection and moral haz-
ard problems, McAfee and McMillian found that, under certain conditions,
the optimal contracts lead to the same outcome whether the principal ob-
serves just the total output or each individual’s contribution. However,
up front payment from the agents to the principal before the start of the
project that they risk forfeiting is often unavoidable. By modifying McAfee
and McMillan’s analysis with the additional restriction of limited liability
on the part of agents to rule out positive monetary transfers to the principal
at any stage of the game, it is shown that the principal would strictly ben-
efit from monitoring individual contributions. In most organizations any
team based project involving employees, it is unreasonable to think that
the employees will pay ex-ante to earn the right to work on the project.
Thus, limited liability is a very natural restriction.
In Chapter three, I have studied communication problem within organi-
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zations that are hierarchically structured. Friebel and Raith (2004) argued
that in hierarchical organizations preventing workers from communicating
directly with the principal could encourage (incompetent) manager to hire
more productive employees, as the threat of being replaced by a more ca-
pable subordinate is negated. That is, a “chain of command” is desirable.
Further, the manager is not allowed to communicate with the principal
as otherwise he might try to use the excuse of poor workers for bad per-
formance. Thus, Friebel and Raith’s argument pivots around ex-ante re-
cruitment incentive at the cost of ex-post inefficient firing (of both good
manager and good workers). Different from Friebel and Raith, by opening
up full communication – both between worker and principal, and manager
and principal – but not allowing the manger to pass the blame onto the
worker, the principal retains partly good recruitment incentive and saves
some of inefficient firing. When the unit does not perform well, the prin-
cipal allows the manager to justify that it is due to bad luck rather than
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Chapter 1
Input or Output Monitoring in
Teams?
1.1 Introduction
Team incentives in organizations are designed to address the twin problems
of adverse selection and moral hazard (e.g., Holmstro¨m, 1982; McAfee and
McMillan, 1991). That is, the principal might not know the players’ types
or possibly cannot observe their efforts. The first constraint renders effort
observability less useful as it is difficult to apportion appropriate credit to
individual contributions.
While the principal may lack the relevant information about the players’
types, the players themselves might know about each other better. But
then the players will have to contend with the free-rider problem in team
games. To better incentivize the players, should the principal give rewards
based on their individual efforts (when efforts can be monitored), or should
1
he simply penalize or reward the players based on collective output? The
first approach known as input monitoring will avoid the free-rider problem
but runs the risk of wasted efforts. The second approach known as output
monitoring avoids the wasted efforts problem but involves free riding. In
this paper, we compare the merits of these two alternative mechanisms.
To keep the paper’s main message clear, we adopt a simpler exposition
by assuming only two agents. Both agents have private information, which
is termed as “specific knowledge” by Jensen and Meckling (1992), that in
practice is too costly to communicate to the principal, and the realization
of agents’ types are only observed by the agents after contracting (see
Sappington, 1983 and Raith, 2008). We abstract away from the possibility
of reporting, as in reality, we do not often see principal asks the agent to
report other agent’s type. The use of such incomplete contract is due to the
following reasons. First, the implementation of mutual reporting is a signal
of distrust from the principal to the agents, which may dampen agents’
incentive in putting in effort (see Herold (2010)). Second, the adoption of
such form of contract may destroy the harmony between the team members,
and may cause renege or reciprocal behavior in the future. In reality,
even if peer reviews are used within the firm, it is often conducted at the
end of each policy year or contractual period, and the agents’ reports are
usually not contracted upon. Third, given such contract, the agents, upon
knowing their types, may collude between themselves, e.g., coordinate on
the announcement of a state of nature that is not the true one. Forth,
the punishment of both agents if their reports do not coincide may not be
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in the principal and agents’ collective interest: what if the agents decide
to tear up the contractual mechanism after a unilateral deviation from
truth telling, that is, what if they decide to renegotiate? Thus, in order
to keep our model simple and tractable, we do not consider type reporting
contract, but instead focus on whether the individual contributions enter
the principal’s production function in a complementary or substitutable
way. We find that when the players’ efforts are perfect complements, the
principal should like to choose output monitoring to tackle mainly the
wasted efforts scenario. When the efforts are perfect substitutes, either
output monitoring or input monitoring might be better, i.e., either wasted
efforts or free-rider problem can be the dominant consideration.2
The intuitions for our results are as follows. With perfect complemen-
tary efforts, a player of high productivity type will see his good efforts
translate into high output provided the other player is also of high pro-
ductivity type and chooses similarly good efforts. If the other player is of
low productivity type, then the incentive for the high productivity type in
putting in good efforts will be less if the rewards are based on total out-
put. But this is no bad an outcome for the principal because if the rewards
were based on individual inputs instead, the high productivity player would
choose efforts to maximize his own utility without considering whether that
would maximize output given the other player’s effort and low type. This
2In one of our other work (see Bag and Wang, 2014b), we have shown that if agents
obtain private information before contracting and if incentive reporting is allowed, the
dominance of input/contributions monitoring holds regardless of whether individual
contributions are substitutes or complements. Indeed, if the input-based contract also
depends on the agents’ reported type profile, the wasted efforts scenario no longer exists
when agents’ efforts are complementary. Further discussion will be given in Appendix
A.
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last response would have damaged the principal’s interests.
When efforts are perfect substitutes in production, the usual free-rider
problem comes to the fore. The principal’s incentives will have to address
the problem of under-provision of efforts. Now input monitoring is likely
to incentivize the players better as they are directly rewarded for their ef-
forts. But there is also a negative aspect of input monitoring. The low
productivity player will put in too much effort without any major contri-
bution to output especially if the difference between the productivity of
high type and low type is significant. So if there is a considerable chance
that the team might have a high-and-low productivity combination, the
principal cannot set too high a wage as the low type will take advantage
of it and put in too much effort whereas the wage cannot be set low either
as that would discourage the high type’s effort. Since the principal will
not know for sure the players’ true type profile, rather than choosing input
monitoring, it might be better to sometimes rely on output monitoring.
Through output monitoring, effectively the principal lets the agents mon-
itor themselves (Varian, 1991; Winter, 2010; Gershkov and Winter, 2013).
The exact choice of the incentive mechanism will depend on the distribu-
tion of player’s types and the difference between the two types’ (high and
low) productivity. Our result will exhibit an U-shape optimal monitoring,
the intuitions for which will be discussed in section 1.4.
The assumption that players know each other’s type plays an important
role in deriving our results, as the players can better coordinate between
themselves when choosing effort. If the type is kept as private information
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to each individual, the advantage or disadvantage of a particular moni-
toring mechanism may not be so obvious. For example, when efforts are
complementary and reward is output-based, if the agent (especially high
type agent) does not know his partner’s type, then he could not choose
effort accordingly in order to avoid the wastage.3 In addition, this assump-
tion also carries practical meaning. For instance, two researchers want to
collaborate and write a paper. A good paper may require both analytical
and writing skills. Some authors maybe good at calculus but may not be
good at data analysis, or they could write better in a logical way than in
a descriptive way. It is only when a topic has been developed and both
authors start to work on it, they will know the nature of this work more
clearly and their respective skills and abilities will be reflected to the team
members.
This work is a close follow-up of Raith (2008), who studied the question
of optimal wage incentives in a principal-agent setting when the principal
can monitor both input and output. The agent (and there is only one) has
“specific knowledge” about the consequences of his actions. The author
compares the incentive implications of input-based pay with output-based
pay. In Raith’s formulation, there is an external production uncertainty so
that the principal has to trade off the agent’s effort incentives against the
agent’s income risk. Output-based pay exposes the agent to income risk,
the burden of which ultimately falls on the principal. In contrast, in our
3Teasley et al.(2002) conducted an empirical study on the performance of software
development teams working either in open space offices or private offices. When the office
is open where the agents can observe each other, productivity is higher and schedule is
shorter, and this is not a pure effect of observability but also due to better coordination
of work and learning from colleagues.
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model the results still apply if there is no production uncertainty and the
associated income risk. Instead, going from a single agent to two agents
setting means our principal will have to address the free-rider problem. This
free-rider problem brings back the conundrum between input monitoring
and output monitoring.4
McAfee and McMillan (1991) considered, in a team setting with both
adverse selection and moral hazard, a direct mechanism in which the agents
report their types and the rewards are determined based on declared types
and realized output or individual contributions. They showed that the prin-
cipal does no worse to rely on output-based incentives: even if the principal
can costlessly monitor individual contributions, the principal’s maximum
expected utility is the same as when he observes only the total output. In
their formulation, the principal can measure individual contributions but
cannot disentangle (the impact of) effort from ability. In many real-world
applications it might be plausible to assume that the principal can only
observe team members’ efforts, e.g., the number of hours put in, but not
the output contributions (as considered by McAfee and McMillan). Our
model assumes non-observability of individual output contributions, which
is fundamental to Holmstro¨m-type team problems. As one of our results
will show, when agents’ efforts are perfect complements, the principal will
do better to rely on output-based incentives which is different from McAfee
4Khalil and Lawarre´e (1994) also compared input and output monitoring in a
principal-agent setting with adverse selection due to privacy of agent’s (productivity)
types. Input (output) monitoring is more beneficial to the principal if he (the agent) is
the residual claimant. If the principal can choose who should be the residual claimant
and the monitoring mechanism, he will always choose himself to be the residual claimant
and use input monitoring.
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and McMillan’s observation.
The works of Che and Yoo (2001), Winter (2010), and Gershkov and
Perry (2013) are in dynamic settings with team members exerting efforts
to the team project sequentially or repeatedly. These are mainly moral
hazard problems with concerns about players’ effort coordinations. Thus
the question of incentivizing efforts in the presence of adverse selection
problem, which is our main concern, does not arise in these models.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 introduces
the formal model. In Section 1.3 we consider the case of complementary ef-
forts, followed by an analysis of substitutable efforts in Section 1.4. Section
1.5 concludes.
1.2 The Model
A principal hires two agents, indexed by j = 1, 2, to work in a team on
a joint project. Both the principal and the two agents are risk neutral.
Each agent can be of low or high ability type with productivity parameter
θ j ∈ {θL , θH }, θH > θL > 0. It is common knowledge that the probability
for an agent being of low ability type θL is p, where 0 < p < 1. Both
the principal and agents knows the distribution of the type before signing
the contract. Each agent knows his own ability as well as the ability of
the other agent only after contracting with the principal, but the principal
does not observe any of this information. As have been discussed in the
introduction, the agent cannot report any of the abilities to the principal.
Each agent j exerts an effort level a j ∈ <+. The agents face the same
7
convex effort cost ϕ(a j ) = d
a2j
2 , d > 0, which is known by the principal.
Output y is determined by agents’ abilities and effort levels, as well as a
random variable  which follows a distribution with mean 0. We assume
that the agents play equal role in the determination of output. Depending
on the nature of the job, the production function takes different forms. If
agents’ efforts are complements, we adopt a Leontief production function,
i.e., y = min{θ1a1 , θ2a2} +  . If agents’ efforts are (perfect) substitutes,
y = θ1a1 + θ2a2 +  .5
Since sometimes information gathering is costly, principal has to decide
whether to measure the effort level or the output level (see Khalil and
Lawarre´e, 1994). Thus, the wage given is based on either input or output.
We adopt the usual convention to use linear wage, i.e., hourly wage contract
or piece-rate contract, because of their practical uses.6 Also, we assume
that the agents face limited liabilities, i.e., their wages cannot be negative
for any level of efforts or output. Thus, we can without loss of generality
set the fixed part of the wage to be 0.
1.3 Complementary Technology
In this section, we will analyze the case when agents’ efforts are perfect
complements, that is y = min{θ1a1 , θ2a2}+  .
 Input Monitoring. Suppose the principal offers wage W (ainj ) =
5Due to the error term, the output can possibly fall below 0. This can be interpreted
as some destructive forces which may cause the damage of the existing properties, such
as machines or raw materials which are used in the production process.
6As the principal and agents are risk neutral and the wage scheme is linear, our
results equally apply to the case with deterministic output.
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αinainj , αin > 0.
Agent j’s ex-post payoff, after contracting with the principal and know-
ing each other’s type, is piinj (a
in





2 , j = 1, 2
7, if he puts in





The expected profit for the principal is
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[p(2− p)θL + (1 − p)2θH − 4αin] = 0,
i.e., αin =
p(2− p)θL + (1 − p)2θH
4
.




p(2− p)θL + (1 − p)2θH
4d
,




[p(2− p)θL + (1 − p)2θH ]2
32d
> 0, j = 1, 2
which is the same as their ex-post payoff.
7Since both agents play equal role in the production function and their effort cost
functions are also the same, their effort choices, and consequently their (expected) payoff,
depend on their types but not their indices. Thus, sometimes, we will slightly abuse the
use of notation and let j refer to H or L.
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The expected profit for the principal is
E[piinp ] =
[p(2− p)θL + (1 − p)2θH ]2
8d
.
Output Monitoring. Now, suppose the principal offers wage based
on the output. Thus, W ′(y) = αout y, αout > 0.
After contracting with the principal, agent j’s ex-post expected pay-
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will respond differently according to the type profile. Thus, we need to
analyze two cases:
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By symmetry, agent k’s best response is similar. Thus, the Nash Equi-
librium of this game is aoutj = a
out
k = a
∗ with any a∗ ∈ [0, αout θ jd ], where θ j
is their productivity.
2. θ j , θk . Without loss of generality, assume θ j = θH and θk = θL.













































We can see that agents should choose effort levels such that θ jaoutj =
θkaoutk . Thus, high type agent’s effort will be restricted by low type agent.
The Nash equilibrium is aoutL ∈ [0, αout θLd ] and aoutH = θLθH aoutL .
Following the standard practice in mechanism design, we look at the
equilibrium that maximizes the principal’s profit. When agents decide to
choose the amount of effort, they already known the wage scheme and
each other’s type. Thus, given a fixed value of αout , agents know that the
principal’s expected profit is E[pioutp ] = (1 − 2αout ) min{θ ja j , θkak} if they
choose efforts a j and ak . When αout < 12 , the agents should choose the
largest Nash effort in order to maximize the principal’s profit. Thus, in the





In the asymmetric case, we assume the effort levels are aoutL =
αout θL
d for low





for high type agent. When αout >
1
2 , agents
should choose the smallest Nash effort, i.e., both agents should choose not
to put in any effort regardless of their types. When αout =
1
2 , agents can
choose any level of Nash effort. However, given agents’ such responses,
principal’s profit is always 0 in the later two cases. Thus, it is not optimal
for the principal to choose any αout ≥ 12 .
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Thus, the expected profit for the principal is




(1 − 2αout )] + (1 − p)2[θ2H
αout
d




(1 − 2αout )[p(2− p)θ2L + (1 − p)
2θ2H ].






[p(2− p)θ2L + (1 − p)





















































Thus, the ex-ante expected payoff for the agents are
E[pioutj (a
out





pθ2L + (1 − p)








and the expected profit for the principal is
E[pioutp ] =




 Comparison. For the input-based pay, since the effort costs are the
same for the two agents regardless of their types, they should exert the
same level of efforts. In the situation that only one of them has higher
productivity, part of his effort is wasted in terms of its contribution to
output, that is to say, the principal gives him some “inessential” additional
reward. For the output-based pay, when the two agents are of different
types, in order to enjoy the same reward, the high type agent does not
need to put in as much effort as the low type agent, and thus, by saving
his effort cost he could obtain a higher ex-post (expected) payoff.
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From the analysis, we can see that if the two efforts are complements,
the high ability agent tends to exert “too much” effort under input mon-
itoring when his partner is low type, while such wastage is avoided under
output monitoring. Thus, we can derive the following result.
Proposition 1.1 Suppose efforts are perfect complements. Then output
monitoring is always better than input monitoring.
Overall, output monitoring outperforms input monitoring by tailoring
agents’ efforts to their respective productivity. As the agents will self “co-
ordinate” between themselves about the efforts they are going to put in,
there will be no waste of effort involved. Consequently, the principal could
obtain higher expected profit under output monitoring by giving just the
right amount of wages to the agents. The free-rider motive (as well as
the uncertainty in the production) should not put output monitoring at a
disadvantage vis-a-vis input monitoring due to complementarity of efforts.
1.4 Substitution Technology
In this section, we will analyze the case when agents’ efforts are substitutes,
i.e., y = θ1a1 + θ2a2 +  .
 Input Monitoring. Suppose the principal offers wage W (ainj ) =
αinainj , α > 0 for both agents. Similar to the case when agents’ efforts are
complements, agent j’s ex-post payoff is piinj (a
in





2 , j = 1, 2,




The expected profit for the principal is
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[pθL + (1 − p)θH − 2αin] = 0,
i.e., αin =
pθL + (1 − p)θH
2
.




pθL + (1 − p)θH
2d
,




[pθL + (1 − p)θH ]2
8d
> 0, j = 1, 2
which is the same as their ex-post payoff.
The expected profit for the principal is
E[piinp ] =
[pθL + (1 − p)θH ]2
2d
.
Here, we can see that the incentive provided depends on the expected
productivity of a particular agent, so does the expected gain for the prin-
cipal.
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Output Monitoring. Now, suppose the principal offers wage based
on the output. Similarly, we can write W ′(y) = αout y, αout > 0 for both
agents. Agent j’s ex-post expected payoff is E[pioutj (a
out
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Then, the ex-ante expected payoff for the agents are
E[pioutj (a
out










and the expected profit for the principal is
E[pioutp ] =





Here, the incentive provided is a constant number, i.e., it does not
depend on the expected productivity of a particular agent. The expected
profit for the principal is related to the expected square of productivity.
 Comparison. Under input monitoring, both types of agents will be
induced to put in same amount of effort level since the rewards per unit
effort level and their cost functions are the same. Under output monitoring,
the amount of effort level chosen by each type of agent is proportional to
his productivity. Thus, the more productive agent tends to put in more
effort (which is different from the complementary efforts case) since he is
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more effective in terms of the effort contribution to the output, while the
less productive agent will free ride on him and shirk but still, enjoy the
same amount of wage. Furthermore, the effort level chosen by low type
agent is smaller under output monitoring comparing with that under input
monitoring, which reinforces the presence of free-rider problem. However,
the result is not straightforward if we compare the effort levels chosen
by high type agent as well as the principal’s expected profit levels under
these two different monitoring mechanisms, and we have come out with the
following corollary.
Corollary 1.1 The effort level chosen by the high type agent under input
monitoring is higher than that under output monitoring if and only if p <
θH
2(θH−θL )
. Furthermore, the expected profit for the principal is also higher
under input monitoring under this condition.
If the probability for the agent to be of low type is less than some
threshold level, the principal would like to increase the wage per unit effort
in order to induce more effort from the high type agent under input moni-
toring, and consequently, to increase his possible profit in the situation that
at least one agent is high type. In this case, the effort chosen by both types
of agents are smaller under output monitoring, and the free-rider problem
becomes relatively significant. Thus, the expected profit for the principal
should be lower under output monitoring.
Note that when p = 12 , input monitoring is better than output moni-
toring since θH2(θH−θL ) >
1
2 . Also note that p <
θH
2(θH−θL )
is only a sufficient
condition to ensure that input based contract could generate a higher ex-
18
pected profit for the principal. Now, we are going to present the necessary
and sufficient conditions such that input monitoring is better than output
monitoring when efforts are substitutes.
Proposition 1.2 8 Suppose efforts are substitutes.
1. Input monitoring is better than output monitoring if and only if any
one of the following conditions is satisfied:
(a) θHθL ≤ 3;
(b) 3 < θHθL ≤ (3+ 2
√
2);9
(c) θHθL > (3+ 2
√
2), and



















(3θH − θL) −
√





(3θH − θL) +
√





Indeed, there are both pros and cons in input and output monitoring
especially when the agents are of different types. For output monitoring,
the principal is able to induce more effort from the high type agent so
as to enhance the total output. In reality, if the principal knows which
8There are some conditions under which input monitoring and output monitoring are
equivalent for the principal. However, in order not to make the results look too messy,
I have slightly abused the language. When the two monitoring mechanisms are equally
well, I will say input monitoring is better.
9Case (a) and (b) can actually be combined. They are explicitly separated here in
order to highlight the difference of their graphs.
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one of the agents is more capable of a particular job, ideally, he should
assign the entire task to this agent. Since the principal cannot differentiate
the agents in our model, by using output monitoring, he can make sure
that the more productive agent bears more burdens which is still, efficient
under asymmetric information. The only drawback is that, the principal
awards too much to the less productive agent so that this agent’s payoff is
even higher than that of the more productive one. This kind of waste in
the investment, or to say, the free-rider problem can be ameliorated under
input monitoring, where the effort level is rewarded, so as to induce more
effort from the less productive agent. However, the incentive for the high
type agent is dampened, as well as the principal’s expected profit, especially
when it is less likely for the agent to be high type.
The results of proposition 1.2 can be illustrated by three graphs.
Figure 1.1: θHθL ≤ 3
Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2 describe the scenario when the productivity
of the high type agent is not too high, indeed, bounded below by (3 +
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Figure 1.2: 3 < θHθL ≤ (3+ 2
√
2)





2)θL. Thus, the advantage of output monitoring is too small to offset
the free-rider problem it brings out. Figure 1.3 illustrates the case when
the productivity of the high type agent is much higher than that of the low
type agent. Initially, when the probability for the agent to be high type is
still significant, i.e., p < θH2(θH−θL ) , the principal is willing to reward a higher
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amount based on input, so as to induce more effort from the high type agent
and raise the overall expected profit. He has successfully done so since the
efforts for both types of agents are higher under input monitoring than
those under output monitoring. However, as p increases more and more,
the expected productivity of any agent decreases. In such situation, it may
not make a great deal for the principal to push them into working long
hours, since the principal will not get much output. On the other hand,
we still have to allow for the fact that one, or even both, of the agents
could be high type with certain probabilities, and since the productivity
of the high type agent is significantly higher, why not relying on output
monitoring mechanism and let agents self select the number of hours they
would like to work. This is to make sure than the high type agent will
work for significantly higher amount of hours under output monitoring, so
as to generate much profit for the principal. When p becomes very large,
the previously mentioned benefit is negligible as it is very unlikely that any
one of the agents is high type. Thus, output monitoring results in the most
undesirable case – low type agents free ride each other – and is surpassed
by input monitoring again.
1.5 Conclusion and Extension
Teamwork is rather a common practice nowadays since cooperation among
team members should improve the efficiency. From the principal’s point
of view, different forms of production will lead to different adoptions of
monitoring mechanism. We have analyzed the case when the efforts of
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team members are complements, and have shown that output-based wage
could generate more profit for the principal since the waste of effort of
the more productive employee has been eliminated, whereas input-based
wage fails to take into account the cooperation between the two agents in
the team. We have also found out that when the two members’ efforts
are substitutes, input-based wage should be preferable by the principal as
long as the difference in the productivity of the two types of agents are
relatively small. When their productivity differ a lot, it is possible for the
output monitoring to outperform since it induces much more effort from
the high type agent.
There are several extensions worth considering in the future. If the
team members do not know each other’s type, then coordination will be-
come a problem especially when their efforts are complements. Thus, the
advantage of output-based wage may not be so obvious. In addition, if the
principal could monitor both inputs and output costlessly, will he choose
to rely on both information in designing contract? Moreover, as what has
been done in the literature, incentive reporting is an effective way to par-
tially solve the problem of asymmetric information. If the agents know
their types before contracting, the principal could design contract based
on the reported types of the agents, and some drawbacks in the monitor-
ing mechanism we have seen in our model may no longer exist. We will




Monitoring in Teams under
Limited Liability
2.1 Introduction
McAfee and McMillan (1991) studied a team monitoring problem where
the principal can incentivize either by collective team performance in the
form of joint output without observing the team members’ individual con-
tributions, or by giving rewards based on individual contributions. The
team members’ (or agents’) abilities are private information. Assuming
the principal can additionally use the agents’ type reports in the incentives,
McAfee and McMillan showed that under appropriate conditions a com-
pensation scheme linear in the team’s aggregate output is optimal. That
is, the disaggregated information on individual contributions is of no extra
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value to the principal; the two types of information are equivalent. This is
a very surprising result – with the disaggregated information the principal
is expected to monitor more directly the individual agents in a team envi-
ronment and incentivize them better. Our focus will be to understand this
puzzle better and contribute to the broad debate of input/contributions vs.
output monitoring .
Later on, Vander Veen (1995) has shown that the above equivalence
result breaks down if the agents are risk averse, as opposed to the risk
neutrality assumption of McAfee and McMillan. He concludes that con-
tributions monitoring, that is, incentivizing the agents based on individual
contributions, is strictly beneficial for the principal. The simple intuition
is that when risk has a price, it is better for the principal to absorb risks as
he is risk neutral. Under output monitoring, each agent faces income un-
certainty due to lack of information about the other team members’ types
and hence efforts, so he makes his effort decision on the guesswork of the
likely contributions from others. If the principal uses contributions mon-
itoring, each agent will have a better control over what he could obtain.
This difference does not matter if the agents are risk neutral as payoffs are
calculated in expectation. In contrast, when the agents are risk averse, re-
wards based on individual contribution remove the uncertainty faced under
output monitoring and thus increase their utilities. Therefore, the princi-
pal can achieve a higher expected utility under contributions monitoring
by eliminating the risk premium he needs to pay to the agents.10
10While there is good intuition why incentivizing agents based on individual contri-
butions should be better under risk aversion, Vander Veen’s proof does not seem very
convincing. See our discussion in the Appendix B.
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We will adopt a different approach to the monitoring debate. Consid-
ering that risk aversion should naturally tilt the principal’s choice towards
contributions monitoring and away from output monitoring, Vander Veen’s
observation does not quite resolve the puzzle posed by McAfee and McMil-
lan. After all, risk neutrality assumed by McAfee and McMillan does not
create any such bias. What remains to be seen therefore is exactly what
aspect of McAfee and McMillan’s optimal output monitoring mechanism
could be critical to their equivalence result, and how plausible that might
be. We identify one such feature that plays a decisive role – the princi-
pal could ask the agents to pay upfront strictly positive amount of money
which they stand to lose if the team output turns out to be “unsatisfac-
tory”. That is, effectively, the principal is asking the agents to pay a fee to
be able to participate in the team activity. We will depart from this im-
portant assumption by requiring that the agents are subjected to limited
liability of not having to make any payment to the principal in any eventual-
ity . Any positive transfer can only be one-sided – from the principal to the
agents and not the other way around. In most team based work arrange-
ments, it is implausible for the main initiator of a project, the principal, to
ask its members to contribute to the project and yet to post at the start
a bond that they might forfeit if team performances do not go according
to plans.11 Our agents might be financially constrained to make such ar-
rangements feasible. While imposing this limited liability restriction, we
still retain McAfee and McMillan’s assumption that the agents are risk
11Exceptions could be law firms or a group of medical doctors in private practices
where junior partners may have to pledge compensation at the start in case the firm (or
the group) does not perform well. Simon Grant suggested this example.
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neutral. With this one modification, we will show that the principal should
strictly prefer monitoring individual contributions over output.
Our argument for the dominance of contributions monitoring will pro-
ceed as follows. We first propose a feasible contributions monitoring con-
tract which could do at least as well as the output monitoring contract. The
constructed contributions monitoring contract is of the take-it-or-leave-it
form, with the principal setting a target individual contribution for each
declared type of an agent (and a reported type profile of the other agents),
and give him an agreed performance reward only if the set target has been
met. This way the agents’ incentives for misreporting will be reduced as
their effort choices following non-truthful reporting are restricted. Thus,
this also implies that the principal can give less information rent to the
agents under contributions monitoring. We then show that under the opti-
mal output monitoring contract, the principal needs to leave positive rent
to the lowest type of at least one agent, while under the optimal contribu-
tions monitoring contract, the principal is able to extract the rent from the
lowest type of every agent. Since the optimal output monitoring contract
can be replicated by contributions monitoring contract with equivalent ex-
pected payoff for the principal, and we know that the replicated contract
is not optimal since the lowest type of at least one agent enjoys positive
rent, we have shown the superiority of contributions monitoring contract.
A more direct intuition can be given as follows. When limited liability
condition is imposed, the principal cannot punish the agents sufficiently
for failing to meet their target contributions, which makes inducing any
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intended efforts more costly. This problem is exacerbated when the agents’
contributions cannot be directly observed so that the principal has to rely
on output monitoring. In this case, if the output level turns out to be
below expectation, the principal is not able to identify who are the main
delinquents. In other words, limited liability and moral hazard, together,
make it very costly for the principal to induce efforts. In the contributions
monitoring contract on the other hand, once the principal specifies a type
contingent target performance for each agent, any deviation in individual
contributions is always detected by the principal. Thus, less information
rents are needed under the contributions monitoring contract.
Earlier in one of the first generation analysis of team moral hazard
problems, Holmstro¨m (1982) had noted that “if there is uncertainty in pro-
duction and if agents are risk averse or have limited endowments, monitor-
ing becomes an important instrument in remedying moral hazard.” Thus,
Vander Veen (1995) confirmed the first part of Holmstro¨m’s claim12 and we
establish the the second part. In some sense, limited liability can be consid-
ered as a specific instance of agent risk aversion with the utility approaching
negative infinity if their payments/rewards become too low. Thus, a sim-
ilarity between our result and that of Vander Veen might not be entirely
surprising. But one must also note that Vander Veen had assumed global
strict concavity of the agent’s utility function, i.e., the agents are strictly
risk averse everywhere, while in our model the agents are risk neutral for all
the positive payments. The requirement of strict concavity is thus central
12Vander Veen (1995) could be seen as confirming the role of risk aversion, but as
pointed out above his proof is doubtful.
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to Vander Veen’s result, and his proof argument cannot be applied directly
to our set up. In addition, by changing agents’ risk attitudes, he does not
exclude the possibility of upfront payment in the optimal contract. Thus,
our paper adopts a new direction in the proof and the contract we proposed
seems more realistic.
Some authors studying principal-agent problems under limited liabil-
ity consider either only the adverse selection problem or only the moral
hazard problem. Innes (1990) examined a principal-agent model of finan-
cial contracting with moral hazard and limited liability. Sappington (1983)
and Lewis and Sappington (2000) derived optimal contracts under adverse
selection and limited liability. Khalil and Lawarre´e (1994) made an ob-
servation in a single agent setting with adverse selection and deterministic
production. When the principal is the residual claimant (same as in McAfee
and McMillan), they argued that input monitoring (where an agent’s effort
can be directly contracted upon) is better than output monitoring (with
no additional information on agent effort). Note that the input monitor-
ing in Khalil and Lawarre´e is not the same as the monitoring of individual
contributions in McAfee and McMillan and this paper, and limited liability
plays no special role in the deterministic production function adopted in
their paper. Lawarre´e and Audenrode (1996) highlighted the importance
of limited liability in an adverse selection model. They showed that when
both the principal and the agent are risk neutral, the optimal contract is
the same regardless of whether the output can be perfectly observed or
not if the agent has unlimited liability, but the optimal contract changes
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significantly under imperfect information if the agent’s liability becomes
limited. Ollier and Thomas (2013) analyzed the properties of optimal out-
put monitoring contract with all three features (adverse selection, moral
hazard and limited liability), but in a single agent framework.
In a related work (Bag and Wang, 2014a), we study a principal-agent
team setting with adverse selection and limited liability but without the
complications of agents’ type reporting. Using linear incentive contracts, it
is shown that if the agents’ efforts are perfect complements an output-based
contract is superior, whereas if the agents’ efforts are perfect substitutes
the result depends on the distribution of the types and the difference in
productivity. In contrast, if incentive reporting is allowed as in the cur-
rent paper, the dominance of contributions monitoring holds regardless of
whether individual contributions are substitutes or complements.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The formal team model
with two types of monitoring contracts are analyzed in Section 2.2. The
results comparing the monitoring contracts are presented in Section 2.3.
Section 2.4 concludes. The proofs appear in Appendix B.
2.2 The Model
A principal wants a team of n agents to undertake a project.13 Both the
principal and the agents are risk neutral. Each agent i is endowed with
ability level zi, i = 1, ..., n. There are m different ability levels, ranging from
13Although we work in a team setting throughout the paper, our results are applicable
in a single agent setting.
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θ1 to θm, and m ≥ 2. It is common knowledge that zi is identically and
independently distributed, and for each agent i, Pr(zi = θ j ) = qj > 0 ∀ j.
Only agent i knows his true ability zi. Each agent i chooses an effort level
privately. Let yi ∈ R+ represent agent i’s individual contribution which is a
combination of i’s ability and effort. The agent’s cost of effort is c(yi , zi) ≥
0, ∀yi , zi, with c(yi , zi) differentiable in yi. Assume that c(0, zi) = 0 and
cy ≥ 0 ∀zi, and for any value of yi , 0, c(yi , θ1) > c(yi , θ2) > ... > c(yi , θm).
Also, c(yi , zi) → ∞ as yi → ∞. The output level x, which is observed by
the principal, depends on each one of the team members’ contributions and
a random variable. Assume that the possible output level x ∈ X , where
X is a non-empty finite set. Let y = (y1 , ..., yn) be the vector of agents’
contributions. Denote the conditional probability of the output x given y
by f (x|y), which is uniformly bounded below by some number a > 0, i.e.,
f (x|y) ≥ a > 0, ∀x , y. Also, f (x|y) is continuous in y. The principal’s
utility is U (x , z) which depends not only on the realized output, but also
on the agents’ abilities. We also normalize the value of each agent’s outside
opportunity to be 0.
Let z−i = (z1 , ..., zi−1 , zi+1 , ..., zn), and for any function Ψ(x , z) or Ψ(y, z)


























ExΨ(x , ·) =
∑
x
Ψ(x , z) · f (x|y).
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By the Revelation Principle, we will focus on truth-telling mechanism.
Let z^i denote agent i’s report to the principal about his ability.
The timing of the game is as follows:
Stage 1: Nature chooses the agents’ abilities (or types). Each agent
learns his own type.
Stage 2: The principal chooses the monitoring mechanism (contribu-
tions or output) and offers each agent a contract specifying the wage con-
tingent on the profile of declared types and the principal’s verifiable report
of the agent’s contribution (if observable) or the team’s output.
Stage 3: Each agent signs the contract if it guarantees at least his
reservation utility.
Stage 4: The agents publicly declare their types simultaneously.
Stage 5: The agents choose their contribution levels simultaneously,
determining the output.
Stage 6: Either individual contributions or the output level is revealed
to the principal depending on the monitoring mechanism in place.
Stage 7: Wages are paid according to the signed contract.
 Output Monitoring Contract. In the output monitoring contract,
the principal can only observe the aggregate team output, so he commits
in advance to a payment rule pi (x , z^i , z^−i). That is, each agent’s payment
depends on the realized output, his report of his own ability (or type), and
the other agents’ declared types.
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The principal’s profit and the agents’ payoffs are respectively
φ(x , z, z^) = U (x , z) −
n∑
i=1
pi (x , z^i , z^−i),
pii (x , zi , z^i , yi , z^−i) = pi (x , z^i , z^−i) − c(yi , zi), i = 1, ..., n.






[U (x , z) −
n∑
i=1
pi (x , zi , z−i)] f (x|y(zi , z−i))
subject to the feasibility constraints:
∑
x




pi (x , zi , z−i) f (x|y′i , y−i (zi , z−i)) − c(y
′









pi (x , z^i , z−i) f (x|y′i (zi , z^i , z−i), y−i ( z^i , z−i)) − c(y
′
i (zi , z^i , z−i), zi)],




pi (x , zi , z−i) f (x|y(zi , z−i)) − c(yi (zi , z−i), zi)] ≥ 0, ∀i, zi
(PC(out))
pi (x , z^i , z^−i) ≥ 0, ∀i, x , z^i , z^−i. (LL(out))
We have normalized a typical agent’s reservation payoff to zero in
PC(out). Also, different from McAfee and McMillan’s (1991) analysis we
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impose the limited liability constraint for the agents as in LL(out), i.e., re-
gardless of the output level or type declarations the agents cannot be asked
to make positive transfers to the principal. In reality, the agents might be
financially constrained to make upfront payment feasible.
The following result gives the optimal monitoring question a proper
benchmark.




p∗(·), y∗(·)) : (p∗(·), y∗(·)) solves the program [Pout]}
to be the set of optimal output monitoring contracts. Thus, for any
(p∗(x , z^i , z^−i), y∗( z^i , z^−i)) ∈ C∗out , when other players truthfully report their
types z−i and choose contributions according to y∗−i ( z^i , z−i), the interim
expected payoff of a type zi agent reporting z^i and contributing yi is
Expii (x , zi , z^i , yi , z−i) =
∑
x
p∗i (x , z^i , z−i) f (x|yi , y
∗
−i ( z^i , z−i))−c(yi , zi), ∀z−i.
Define Y^ outi (zi , z^i , z−i) ≡ arg maxyi Expii (x , zi , z^i , yi , z−i) where z^i , zi, i.e.,
given other agents’ type profile z−i, any y^outi (zi , z^i , z−i) ∈ Y^ outi (zi , z^i , z−i) is
the optimal contribution level of agent i if he misreports his type to be z^i.
That Y^ outi (zi , z^i , z−i) , ∅ can be guaranteed by using an argument similar
to the last part of Step 2 in the proof of Lemma 2.1.
Clearly, the highest possible ex-ante expected payoff to agent i if he
misreports his type as z^i cannot be higher than what he could obtain by
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p∗i (x , zi , z−i) f (x|y




p∗i (x , z^i , z−i) f (x|y^
out
i (zi , z^i , z−i), y
∗
−i ( z^i , z−i)) − c( y^
out
i (zi , z^i , z−i), zi)],
∀i, zi , z^i , (IC-type*(out))
 Contributions Monitoring Contract. Now, suppose the principal
could costlessly monitor each individual’s contribution, so that he could
pay agent i according to his contribution yi as well as the reported profile
of abilities ( z^i , z^−i). Denote the payment by p¯i (yi , z^i , z^−i).
The principal’s profit and the agents’ payoffs are respectively
φ¯(x , y, z, z^) = U (x , z) −
n∑
i=1
p¯i (yi , z^i , z^−i),
pii (zi , z^i , yi , z^−i) = p¯i (yi , z^i , z^−i) − c(yi , zi), i = 1, ..., n.
Note that agent’s payoff does not depend on other agents’ contributions.
Thus, for a given payment function p¯i (yi , z^i , z^−i), when other players truth-
fully report their types, the interim payoff of agent i with type zi reporting
z^i and contributing yi is
pii (zi , z^i , yi , z−i) = p¯i (yi , z^i , z−i) − c(yi , zi), ∀z−i.
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Thus, the principal solves the following program:
[Pin] max




[U (x , z)−
n∑
i=1
p¯i ( y¯i (zi , z−i), zi , z−i)] f (x|y¯(zi , z−i))
subject to the feasibility constraints:
pii (zi , zi , y¯i (zi , z−i), z−i) ≥ pii (zi , zi , yi , z−i), ∀i, zi , z−i , yi (IC-effort(in))
E−ipii (zi , zi , y¯i (zi , z−i), z−i) ≥ E−ipii (zi , z^i , yi (zi , z^i , z−i), z−i), ∀i, zi , z^i , yi (zi , z^i , z−i)
(IC-type(in))
E−ipii (zi , zi , y¯i (zi , z−i), z−i) ≥ 0, ∀i, zi (PC(in))
p¯i (yi , z^i , z^−i) ≥ 0, ∀i, yi , z^i , z^−i. (LL(in))
2.3 Contributions Monitoring vs. Output
Monitoring
 Weak Dominance of Contributions Monitoring. We are going to
propose a feasible contributions monitoring contract that weakly dominates
the output monitoring contract.
Consider the following punishing mechanism Min:
Given the reported profile ( z^i , z^−i), the principal specifies a contribu-
tion level y¯i ( z^i , z^−i) for each agent. Since the principal could now monitor
individual performances, if y¯i ( z^i , z^−i) is produced, he gives agent i a non-
negative reward, and otherwise gives him zero reward.
Thus, the agent should either choose to meet the target y¯i ( z^i , z^−i), or
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completely shirk by contributing 0.
Define Y^ ini (zi , z^i , z−i) ≡ arg maxyi pii (zi , z^i , yi , z−i) where z^i , zi, i.e., given
other agents’ type profile z−i, any y^ini (zi , z^i , z−i) ∈ Y^ ini (zi , z^i , z−i) is the
optimal contribution level of agent i if he misreports his type to be z^i.
Also, we know that Y^ ini (zi , z^i , z−i) , ∅ by the above argument. Thus, the
IC-type(in) constraint is equivalent to the following:
E−ipii (zi , zi , y¯i (zi , z−i), z−i) ≥ E−ipii (zi , z^i , y^ini (zi , z^i , z−i), z−i), ∀i, zi , z^i .
(IC-type*(in))
Proposition 2.1 (Weak dominance) Given any feasible output moni-
toring mechanism (p′(x , z^i , z^−i), y′( z^i , z^−i)), the contributions monitoring
contract with recommended contributions y¯i ( z^i , z^−i) = y′i ( z^i , z^−i) and pay-
ment function




p′i (x , z^i , z^−i) f (x|y
′( z^i , z^−i)), if yi = y¯i ( z^i , z^−i)
0, otherwise
for each i, is feasible and generates the same amount of expected profit for
the principal as that under the feasible output monitoring contract.
Weak dominance works as follows. Given any feasible output based
contract which induces truth-telling, the principal could calculate the equi-
librium individual contribution and the interim expected payoff for each
type of each agent. Thus, in the situation where each agent’s individual
contribution can be perfectly monitored, the principal could induce the
same profile of contributions so as to maintain the same expected output,
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by promising each agent the same expected payoff (as that under output
monitoring) if the agent meets the target. Thus, the principal’s ex-ante
expected equilibrium profit will be the same as before. On the other hand,
if the agent deviates to report as another type under output monitoring,
he has the freedom to choose his deviation contribution, whereas under
contributions monitoring the deviation contribution level is specified by
the principal. If the agent does not meet the target, his effort will be
totally wasted. Such deviation contribution level chosen by the principal
may not necessarily coincide with the agent’s interest. Therefore, we can
see that indeed agents have less incentives to deviate under contributions
monitoring.
 Strict Dominance of Contributions Monitoring. Before showing
strict dominance of contributions monitoring, let us note a property of the
output monitoring contract.
Proposition 2.2 (Information rent in output monitoring) For any
feasible output monitoring contract (p(x , z^i , z^−i), y( z^i , z^−i)), for any agent
i, either every type of him earns 0 information rent, or every type of him
earns strictly positive information rent.
The above proposition states the property of feasible output monitoring
contract, and it also applies to the optimal output monitoring contract.
Thus, we know that for the optimal output monitoring contract, it must
be true that either all types of all agents get 0 information rent or for at
least one agent, every type of him earns strictly positive information rent.
38
The former implies that pi (x , zi , z−i) = 0 and yi (zi , z−i) = 0 ∀i, x , zi , z−i.
In fact, this is a trivial feasible output monitoring contract, and it might
possibly be optimal under certain conditions, e.g., when c(yi , zi) = ∞ or
the cost is very large ∀yi , 0. However in reality, we rarely see this type
of contract, that is the principal hires a group of agents and intends to
induce no efforts from them, and pays them nothing regardless of their
abilities and the output level. Thus, to be more realistic, for the optimal
output monitoring contract, we assume that for at least one agent, every
type of him earns strictly positive information rent, or rather, we are only
interested in this type of contract.
McAfee and McMillan’s have shown that their optimal output monitor-
ing contract has the feature that the lowest type agent earns 0 information
rent. In our model, after including the limited liability constraint, it is not
possible to extract all the surplus from the lowest type agent. To maintain
the incentive for high effort, it usually requires a big pay dispersion based
on different levels of output, and to minimize the cost of principal, negative
transfer for low performance is thus necessary. However, with the restric-
tion of limited liability, the minimum payment can only be set to 0, which
makes the creation of the spread of payments more costly for the principal.
If the principal wants to extract all the information rent from the lowest
type agent, the only way is to set the payment to him to be 0 regardless of
the output level and other agents’ type profile, since any positive payment
creates an opportunity for the lowest type agent to earn positive rent if he
puts in 0 contribution in all contingencies. In addition, without violating
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his incentive in type reporting, the principal needs to set 0 payments to all
other types of agents as well regardless of the output level. In the end, for
all types of this agent, all the payments and the induced contribution lev-
els are 0. As we have discussed earlier, for interesting class of contracting
problems, this cannot hold for all the agents.
In addition, the contributions monitoring contract should possess the
following property.
Lemma 2.2 For any punishing contributions monitoring contract Min
that is feasible, suppose there exists a particular type of an agent for whom
all the IC-type*(in) and PC(in) constraints are not binding. Then, there
exists another feasible contributions monitoring contract which generates a
strictly higher expected profit for the principal.
The above lemma states that the contributions monitoring contract
which involves the existence of a particular type of an agent for whom the
IC-type*(in) and PC(in) constraints are non-binding cannot be optimal.
This is because if the contributions monitoring contract possesses the above
property, the principal always has a room to lower some fixed reward (which
also depends on other agents’ types) given to him which is initially positive,
without violating any of the IC-type*(in), PC(in) and LL(in) constraints.
Also, none of the agents’ contributions will change. Thus, doing so leads
to a higher expected profit for the principal.
By making use of Lemma 2.2, we could derive the following property
for the optimal contributions monitoring contract.
40
Proposition 2.3 (Information rent) Suppose the optimal contributions
monitoring contract exists. Then for each agent i, the lowest type must earn
0 information rent, i.e., E−ipii (θ1 , θ1 , y¯i (θ1 , z−i), z−i) = 0, ∀i.
While limited liability constraint makes a significant difference in the
optimal output monitoring contract, it seems that the effect is at least
not so visible in the optimal contributions monitoring contract. Unlike
output-based pay, the principal does not need to rely on pay dispersion
if the contributions can be observed and directly incentivized. Thus, the
principal could still ask for positive contribution from the lowest type agent,
and gives him payment which is just enough to cover his cost, so as to
make the agent just indifferent between participating or not. The lowest
type agent’s IC-type*(in) can also be satisfied, since for any higher type
he reports as, the contribution level specified by the principal will be too
costly for him, making him choose to rather exert no effort and obtains
nothing in all contingencies.
However, that is not to say that limited liability plays no role in the
optimal contributions monitoring contract. In fact, it still makes harder
for the principal to sustain the truthful reporting incentives. For example,
when a type zi agent is contemplating to report as a type z ′i agent, where
z ′i > zi, suppose for some type profile z−i, this agent finds out that it
is very costly for him to follow the principal’s recommendation when he
reports as type z ′i as it will give him a negative payoff. Without limited
liability, the punishment for putting in 0 contribution might possibly be
even more negative, which leaves the agent with no better option but to
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follow the recommended contribution. If limited liability is imposed, the
least punishment can only be set to 0, and thus, the type zi agent indeed
finds it beneficial not to follow the principal’s recommendation, and his
interim deviation payoff increases from negative to 0. Thus, in order to
induce the agents to truthfully report their types, the principal needs to
give some extra limited liability rent to the agents.
We can use Propositions 2.2 and 2.3 to show that the weakly dominant
contributions monitoring contract that we proposed in Proposition 2.1 can-
not be optimal. Thus, we can claim the following result:
Proposition 2.4 (Strict dominance) Suppose for the optimal output mon-
itoring contract, it is not true that every type of every agent earns 0 infor-
mation rent. Then contributions monitoring contract is strictly superior to
output monitoring contract, i.e., the principal’s maximum expected profit
from monitoring individual contributions is strictly higher than that when
he observes only total output.
Strict dominance works as follows. By Proposition 2.1, we could repli-
cate the optimal output monitoring contract with a contributions moni-
toring contract which generates the same expected payoff for the princi-
pal. By Proposition 2.2, we know that under this replicated contribution
monitoring contract, for at least one agent, the lowest type of him earns
strictly positive information rent. However, by Proposition 2.3, we know
that such contract cannot be optimal since the lowest type must earn 0
ex-ante expected payoff under the optimal contributions monitoring con-
tract. Thus, the optimal contributions monitoring contracts should gener-
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ate strictly higher expected profit for the principal than what the replicated
contract as well as the optimal output monitoring contract can do.
Here, the assumption for the property of the optimal output monitoring
contract is important. If every type of every agents earns 0 information rent
under the optimal output monitoring contract, then, it might be possible
that the replicated contributions monitoring contract is also optimal. Nev-
ertheless, we have pointed out earlier that we are not interested in this type
of contract. Thus, the strict dominance result still holds in our framework.
Our results are quite different from that of McAfee and McMillan.
Theirs is about the equivalence of two monitoring mechanisms, whereas we
show strict dominance of contributions monitoring. Technically, LL(out)




pi (x , z^i , z^−i) f (x|y¯( z^i , z^−i)) ≥ 0 when yi = y¯i ( z^i , z^−i). As p¯i (yi , z^i , z^−i)
is constructed in expected form, LL(in) is a less stringent condition than
LL(out). Intuitively, when limited liability condition is imposed, princi-
pal cannot punish the agents sufficiently in case of low output level, which
makes inducing high effort more costly. This problem is exacerbated when
agents’ contributions cannot be directly observed, which increases their
incentives to shirk. In other words, as the principal bears the cost of un-
certainty in production, limited liability and moral hazard together make
it very costly for the principal to induce effort. In the contributions moni-
toring contract, any shirking is easily detected. Once the principal specifies
a target for each agent, the agent can only obtain his promised rewards by
putting in enough effort. Thus, less information rent is needed under the
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contributions monitoring contract.
 Agents as the Residual Claimants. So far, the results we have
obtained are based on the fact that the principal is the residual claimant.
Khalil and Lawarre´e (1994) observed that input (effort) monitoring is more
beneficial to the principal if he is the residual claimant, so our results
can be treated as an extension of their work to team settings to some
extent, although their definition of “input” is different from our definition
of “contribution”. On the other hand, they also found that if the agent is
the residual claimant, output monitoring is more beneficial to the principal.
So we would also like to briefly address this side of the problem, i.e., when
the agents are the residual claimants.
In our model, the output is stochastic and agents have limited liabilities,
whereas in Khalil and Lawarre´e’s work, the output level is deterministic and
there is no explicit limited liability constraints imposed on the agent’s side.
However, the participation constraint in their paper is enough to guarantee
the limited liability condition when the agent is the residual claimant, that
is the agent cannot pay any amount which is higher than the output level
to the principal. In our model with stochastic output, if the principal
wants to design a contract based only on the output and reported types,
the transfer from the agents to the principal has to be non-positive in order
to satisfy the limited liability constraint, especially when the output level
is very low, e.g., 0. Thus, the stochastic nature of the output and limited
liability condition, together, renders our problem almost infeasible when
the agents are residual claimants.
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Nevertheless, it is still interesting to consider the problem of residual
claimancy in a team framework, perhaps in a different setting. It is com-
monly seen that the principal may like to delegate the project to a team
of agents due to their possession of private information or expertise, and
collect contingent transfers. How should agents divide the residual output
(after paying the principal) among themselves? The principal might be
able to design a contract by proposing a way of split of the residual profits
among the agents. Or the principal could assign the project to only one
of the agents, e.g., ask them to bid and pass down the project to the one
with the highest bid, then this agent could sub-contract with the other
agents. Or the principal could allocate the project to the entire team, and
let the agents decide how to share the residuals among themselves. Project
delegation is an important issue; see, for instance, Armstrong and Vickers
(2010) in the single-agent setting. All these remain to be explored in future
works.
2.4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have compared the two most commonly observed forms of
contract in a team setting with adverse selection, moral hazard, and limited
liability. McAfee and McMillan indicated that the source of inefficiencies
in the team problem must lie in features assumed away in their analy-
sis: agents’ risk aversion or collusion. We have proposed another possible
source, agents’ limited liabilities, which also leads to the problem of team
inefficiencies. The conjunction of moral hazard and limited liability allows
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the agent to derive a limited liability rent under output monitoring, and
the rent will be less under contributions monitoring as the moral hazard
problems mostly disappear with contracts written in terms of individual
performance. The principal’s profit is thus strictly higher under contribu-
tions monitoring, in contrast with what McAfee and McMillan have argued.
Our results equally apply in a single agent setting with stochastic output
using similar explanation. The usual free-rider problem in the multi-agent
setting (see Holmstro¨m, 1982) does not play an important role in deriving
our results. This is because in the current analysis, we are only interested
in the comparison between output and contributions monitoring contracts,
whereas most of the literature concerning free-rider problem focus on the
study of optimal contract based on the output. In both single agent and
team setting, limited liability condition imposes more restriction for the
principal on the output based contract, since the principal needs to bear
all the possible levels of (bad) outcomes by promising non-negative returns,
while such burden can be alleviated when the contract is based on indi-
vidual contributions. We analyze team setting in order to make direct
comparison with the work of McAfee and McMillan (1991) by highlighting
the importance of limited liability constraints.
In the current analysis, we have compared the principal’s profit, but
derived neither the optimal output monitoring contract nor the optimal
contributions monitoring contract. The optimal output monitoring single
agent case was analyzed by Ollier and Thomas (2013). The analysis of the
team setting would be more challenging, as it involves free-rider problems
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since the agent’s reward will depend on other agents’ contributions if pay-
ment is output based. If the team members’ contributions can be easily
monitored, we have shown that the principal should rely on contribution-
based incentives, but what the true optimal contributions monitoring con-




Empowering a Manager or
Giving Voice to a Subordinate
3.1 Introduction
Communication is essential to business success. At a basic level, employees
who do not know what is expected from them seldom perform to their
potential. On the other hand, principal also needs to be informed about the
capabilities of his employees so as to better implement personnel transfer
if necessary. This paper mainly focuses on the latter communication issue.
Organizations are normally hierarchically structured, from the princi-
pal to the manager and to the worker. The first communication channel
we would like to focus on is the one between the worker and the princi-
pal, or “skip-level communication”. This has been studied extensively in
the literature and several papers have expressed certain degree of oppo-
sition to this channel. Friebel and Raith (2004) showed that in order to
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prevent being replaced by a high-quality subordinate, the incapable man-
ager tends to suppress the employee even if the team’s overall performance
will be harmed.14 In a situation where open communication between the
principal and the worker (skip-level communication) is forbidden, a “chain
of command” makes it difficult for the worker to reveal his superiority to
the principal, and thus, the low-quality manager will be more willing to
appoint good workers. Ting (2008) also provided conditions under which
whistleblowing should be banned.
The purpose of this paper is to show that, in contrast to those opin-
ions, skip-level communication definitely has a positive function. A clear
chain of command is of course important, as are well-defined roles and
responsibilities, but whistleblowers also play a critical role in revealing or-
ganizational information, and they have long enjoyed political and legal
protection. The benefit of the skip-level communication is such that the
principal receives unfiltered and undistorted information that is typically
missing in the chain of command system, and sometimes, the principal
can directly assess subordinates’ talent, and may promote them to more
suitable positions.
In the setup proposed by Friebel and Raith (2004), principal will fire
the incapable manager and promote the good worker upon receiving the
information that the worker is more productive than the manager, regard-
less of the outcome of the project. This largely reduces the bad manager’s
incentive to hire good workers, thus overall, making the conclusion in favor
14In politics, Egorov and Sonin (2011) studied the trade-off between loyalty and com-
petency of the agent. Knowing that more competent viziers are prone to treason, the
weak ruler tends to hire mediocre but loyal subordinates.
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of a closed communication. However, in reality, the principal usually does
not spend time to evaluate the ability of the manager, as long as the unit
performs well. In other words, investigation, if necessary, is only carried
out when bad outcome occurs. Thus, in our work, to be more realistic,
we study the implementation of communication policy only when the unit
does not perform up to standard. In this case, the incompetent manager
is protected to some degrees and is more incentivized to hire good workers
in order to improve the quality of the final product.15
We also highlight another communication channel which has been ne-
glected by Friebel and Raith (2004) and most of the literature: the commu-
nication between the manager and the principal. It is commonly seen that
manager makes regular reports to the principal about the performance of
his unit. When the worker is allowed to blow the whistle against his direct
boss, the manager’s explanatory power should not be diluted. In fact, he
is the one who is closer to the principal, so when bad outcome happens he
should be given the chance to defend himself.
Therefore, in our framework, when the principal assigns a task to the
manager and the manager, together with the worker, makes it a success, the
principal will build up more confidence in the manager’s ability. However,
once the project fails, the principal will decide whether to discover the truth
behind it, e.g., to understand whether the failure is due to the incompetency
of the manager, or is purely caused by some uncontrollable factors. If the
15Segendorff (2000) also investigated an equilibrium which involves incompetent man-
ager hiring competent workers since the gain from blaming failure on an incompetent
worker is outweighed by the cost of lowering expected outcomes when the manager
himself is also incompetent.
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manager is found out to be at fault, he will be penalized or even fired; at the
same time, if his subordinate is proven to be more capable of this job during
the investigation, this worker may have a high chance to be promoted.
Thus, the transfer of the manager and the worker largely depends on the
communication channels and rules.
We have shown that under certain conditions, an open communication
is overall beneficial,16 and the intuitions are as follows. While we allow
for the fact that open communication provides the opportunity for the
good worker to blow the whistle about his inefficient boss, which in turn
reduces the incentive for the bad manager to hire a good worker, it also
helps the principal successfully replace the incompetent manager with a
higher quality one. These improve the firm’s expected performance in the
next period. Furthermore, open communication also prevents the principal
from mistakenly firing a good manager when the output is bad due to some
unforseen circumstances, if the good manager could provide valid reasons
to justify. In some situations, the later benefits overweigh the drawbacks.
Our paper explains why “pay for luck” could be an effective strategy
as the principal benefits by disregarding the report from the worker and
retaining a bad manager as long as the output is good. In our setup, after
the bad manager has sunk his effort in hiring good workers, he can be
retained only when the output is good. Since the output is stochastic,
whether he will be retained or fired depends largely on his luck. Here, luck
16Kim, Lawarre´e and Shin (2004) have studied a model of imperfect communication,
in which only the supervisor (manager) can talk to the principal. They have shown
that granting an exit option to the agent makes the principal better off as it indeed
serves as a communication channel between the agent and the principal. Their work
thus emphasize the important role of open communication within a firm.
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is partly due to the manager’s opportunity in getting a good worker which
could increase the probability to produce a good output, as well as the
production uncertainty in our model. It is fair to determine the manager’s
position based on the stochastic output due to the following reasons. First,
since the manager’s type is ex-ante unobservable to the principal as well
as any outside company, a high-level output enhances the image of the
manager, signaling that he is more capable of doing certain jobs regardless
of his true ability. His outside wage also moves positively with such luck
(see Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001, and Gopalan, Milbourn and Song,
2007). Thus, upon seeing a high-level output, the principal should retain
this proven-to-be capable manager. Second, by knowing that he will be
paid for some luck that is positively related to his effort, the bad manager
will try harder in looking for a good worker so as to increase the chance
to deliver a high-level output. In this case, firm’s expected profit is also
increased.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the model. Sec-
tion 3.3 analyzes the equilibrium strategies of the managers and the optimal
openness policy. Section 3.4 lists out other types of possible equilibrium
strategies for the principal. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Model
We adopt a similar model as Friebel and Raith (2004)’s so as to make
easy comparison. There are three players in this game: a principal (P), a
manager (M) and a worker (W). The timing of the game is as following.
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Stage 1: P hires M. M is productive (good) with probability α0, and
is unproductive (bad) with probability 1 − α0. Here, M’s type is purely
random and is unknown to himself until he starts his job.
Stage 2: M chooses α ∈ [0, 1], which is the probability that W is good.
Thus, with probability 1−α, W is bad. It can be thought that α represents
the amount of time or effort M spends in hiring or training W in order
to improve W’s productivity. We assume that M incurs a cost C(α) =
k0α2+ k1(1− α)2, where k0, k1 ≥ 0. Following Friebel and Raith (2004), k0
is a cost parameter representing M’s productive effort, whereas k1 denotes
the extent for which P monitors M’s personnel decisions.
Stage 3: M and W observe each other’s type.
Stage 4: M and W jointly produce the first-period output y. It can be
observed by P but cannot be contracted. Here, y is random and takes
the value 0 (low output) or 1 (high output), depending only on the pro-
ductivities of M and W. Let qi j = Pr{y = 1| M = i and W = j}, where
i, j ∈ {good , bad}.
Stage 5: If the output level is 1,no communication is allowed. If the
output level is 0, P will ask for nonobligatory reports from M and W. If
the team is of the form (M=bad, W=good), W can credibly and costlessly
send a non-contracted signal to P to reveal the types of M and W. If the
team is of the form (M=good, W=good), M can also credibly and costlessly
send a non-contracted signal to P to reveal the types of M and W. With a
probability φ ∈ [0, 1], each piece of information can reach P successfully.
Stage 6: P retains or replaces M. Based on his updated beliefs in M
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and W, P chooses whether to retain the current M, fire M and hire a new
one from outside, or fire M and promote W.
Stage 7: M retains or replaces W. A retained or newly hired M knows
the current W’s type. He will act in the firm’s interest and retain W if he
is good or hire a new W if the current one is bad. A just promoted M hires
a new W from outside. Any newly hired W is good with probability α0,
regardless of the nature of person that hired him.
Stage 8: The second-period output is realized.
This is a two-period dynamic game, and the players who are strate-
gically involved are P and M. For the communication between P and M
as well as P and W, we assume that M and W always truthfully report
or conceal the team’s type if they are asked, since faking evidence is too
costly for them. P receives a signal z = d1 if W successfully signals to him
that W is good and M is bad. Also, P receives a signal z = d2 if M success-
fully informs him that both of M and W are good. If either the team is of
another form or both their signals do not get to P, z = c. Note that both
M and W have incentives to produce hard evidence in favor of them. It is
optimal for good W to send a signal if he is better than M since he may
get a chance to be promoted without any loss. Also, it is optimal for good
M to send a signal if both team players are good since he is less likely to be
fired because of bad luck. Here, we assume P ignores the report from M if
it takes the form (g,b), i.e., M is good but W is bad. M’s responsibility is
not only to produce good output but also to recruit good worker to work
with him. Even if the bad output is largely caused by the bad W, P should
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not accept M’s explanation and consequently forgive him since it is M who
has failed his task in the recruitment process.
We assume that the both M and W receive fixed wages in each period,
and are given by rM > rW > 0, since it is more important to be a manager
than a worker. Also, if M is fired after the first period, we assume that he
will only receive rW in the second period for simplicity. The wage difference
can be thought as a punishment for M once he is fired, or the depreciation
in his value if he is hired by another company. Thus, M chooses α to
maximize his expected payoff
U (α) = rM − C(α) + δ{Pret (α)rM + [1 − Pret (α)]rW },
where Pret (α) is the probability that M is retained, as a function of α and
his own type, and δ is the discount factor.
Incorporating M’s response, P makes decision to maximize the firm’s
expected profit, written as
pi = p1 · q + δE(p2) · q + (1 + δ)ωφ − (1 + δ)(rM + rW ),
where p1 and p2 are P’s beliefs about the composition of the (M,W)-
team in the first and second period and are characterized by the proba-
bility distribution over the four possible team combinations (g,g), (g,b),
(b,g) and (b,b). q is a vector denoting the firm’s technology, i.e., q =
(qgg , qgb, qbg , qbb). Here, we also assume that there is some other bene-
fit brought by open communication which is captured by the parameter
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ω ≥ 0.17
Following Friebel and Raith (2004), we assume that qgg ≥ qgb ≥ qbg ≥
qbb, preserving the monotonicity property of M and W’s productivity. Also,
we will make use of the following constraints:
Assumption 3.1 qgg > qgb + qbg.




Assumption 3.3 qbg − qbb > 1 − qgg.
Assumption 3.4 α0 > max{1 −
qbg
qgb
, α0g ≡ 2k1+δ(1−qgb )(rM−rW )2(k0+k1) }.
All the assumptions are sufficient conditions for the equilibrium to have
the properties described in our Proposition 3.1 below. Note that Assump-
tion 3.1 implies qgg − qgb > qbg − qbb, which signals the complementary
property of M and W’s productivity. Assumption 3.4 implies α0 > α
0
g and
from Proposition 3.1 below, α0g denotes the highest possibility that a good
M hires a good W. Also, from our result below, we will have α0g > αb, where
αb denotes bad M’s optimal strategy in hiring a good W. This inequality
implies that getting a good M is always more likely than getting a good W
regardless M’s type. Thus, promoting W without any communication can
never be the optimal decision.
Note that our Assumption 3.1 is the same as the Assumption 2 in Friebel
and Raith(2004)’s paper, and our Assumption 3.4 implies their Assumption
3. In fact, the values of the parameters in our paper and their paper share
some common range.
17Our results do not depend crucially on the existence of such parameter ω. We
include it here just in order to make direct comparison with Friebel and Raith’s work.
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3.3 Equilibrium and optimal openness of com-
munication
In this section, we first derive the equilibrium strategies of P and M, and
then determine the openness policy chosen by the firm’s planner.
Proposition 3.1 Under Assumptions 3.1-3.4, there exists a unique Bayesian
Nash equilibrium. It has the following properties:
(i) a good M chooses
αg = min{
2k1 + δ[qgg − qgb + (1 − qgg)φ](rM − rW )
2(k0 + k1)
, 1},
(ii) a bad M chooses
αb = min{
2k1 + δ(qbg − qbb)(rM − rW )
2(k0 + k1)
, 1}.
(iii) P adopts the following strategy:
(a) If y = 1, no communication is allowed. P retains M and M decides
whether to retain W;
(b) If y = 0, and
(i) if z = d1, P promotes W, who subsequently hires a new W;
(ii) if z = d2, P retains M and M retains W;
(iii) if z = c, a new M is hired from outside and M decides whether to
retain W.
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Note that Assumptions 3.1-3.4 are sufficient but not necessary condi-
tions for the equilibrium to have the properties described under Proposition
3.1. The necessary and sufficient conditions are conditions (A3.1)–(A3.4)
described in the proof of Appendix B. Here, the equilibrium strategy used
by the principal seems to be better than the one obtained by Friebel and
Raith (2004) since it induces both good and bad managers to invest more
efforts in choosing good worker.
In Friebel and Raith (2004)’s equilibrium policy, P promotes W as long
as the team’s type is (b,g) and this information is successfully delivered,
regardless of the output level. Such a strategy used in their paper tilts the
balance towards closed communication, as the principal wants to protect
the bad M in order to incentivize him to hire good worker. However, in
reality, principal normally does not initiate an investigation on the manager
as long as the unit performs well. Thus, the possible scenario in Friebel
and Raith’s policy, that is replacing the bad manager with the good worker
when output is good, is not usually seen. An alternative protection method
we have proposed here is that we do not allow W to bitch about M when
y = 1: the communication policy is relevant only when y = 0. This strategy
is not only more realistic, but also weakens the benefit brought by closed
communication in the previous case. In fact, in our setup, the optimal
choice for bad M does not depend on the communication policy: as long as
the output is good, the bad M is not threatened to be replaced by a good
W regardless of the communication rule implemented by P. The bad M is
therefore more likely to hire good W to enhance the chance of high-level
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output since it is safer for him to do that.
Here, someone may argue that it might be unfair that once the team’s
type is realized as (b,g), whether the bad M is retained or fired depends
solely on the stochastic output level. The bad M’s replacement can only be
triggered by a bad outcome which is due to bad luck. In other words, the
bad M can be retained only because he is so lucky that the output turns
out to be 1. Here, we need this kind of “pay for luck” strategy because it
specifically aims at providing incentive to encourage bad M to hire good
W. Basically, there are two kinds of luck involved: first, the bad M is lucky
to get a good W; second, the output is lucky to be 1. While the second
luck seems to be out of M’s control, the first one is positively related to his
effort level. If the bad M does not spend much effort, it is more likely that
he hires a bad W, and consequently, the output is very unlikely to be 1,
which largely increases the chance of M being fired. Therefore, P rewards
the bad M not only purely on luck, but indeed, also on his effort. Only
when the bad M spends enough effort, the chance to get a good W can be
enhanced, so does the chance to produce good output.
In addition, the result shown in Friebel and Raith (2004)’s paper fails
to consider from the good M’s point of view. Their equilibrium strategy
indicates that when y = 0, M is fired regardless of his type. In reality,
we should allow M to defend himself so as to understand whether the low
output level is due to bad luck (when both M and W are actually good)
or his incompetency to the job (either he is bad, or the W he hired is
bad). In fact, this particular result is due to their Assumption 1: qgg = 1.
59
In their model, when P observes a low-level output, he knows for sure
that the composition of the team cannot be (g,g). This might be a too
simplified assumption which results in the limitation in P’s equilibrium
strategy. Thus, in our work, we have relaxed this assumption, providing
M with a chance to show that both W and himself are good in the case
of y = 0. If no explanation is heard, M is fired. We can see that the
communication policy does play a part in good M’s optimal decision.
When the principal decides whether to accept the report (g,b) and retain
the good M in this case, he faces a trade-off. If the good M is fired, the
probability for P to secure a good M in the second period drops with
certainty, but this punishment can also threaten the good M to try all
means to hire a good W in the first place: the good M understands that
if he wants to be retained in the second period, either the team produces
a good output in the first period for which the likelihood is the highest
when W is also good, or he could well defend himself by showing that both
of them are capable in the unlucky event that the output is bad. Under
Assumption 3.4, P knows that the probability to hire a good M in the
second period is still above some threshold level, making P not will to hear
any explanation from M if the team’s type is not (g,g).
Comparing αg with αb, we can observe that a bad M chooses a weakly
lower probability than a good M does for any given φ. The first reason is
due to the complementary assumption, in which a good M values a good W
more than a bad M does. Second, in our model, a bad M is also afraid of
being replaced by a good W, and thus, reducing his effort in finding a good
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W, although this issue is slightly mitigated according to the principal’s
strategy. In Friebel and Raith(2004)’s result, a bad M will be replaced
when the information of W’s superiority reaches P, or if not, when the
output is low. In our model, a bad M is replaced only if the output is low,
and thus, it is now more likely for him to hire a good W. On the other
hand, the good M now has even more incentive to hire good W because of
the protection provided by P, and his choice αg is increasing in φ: the more
open the communication, the more likely the good M can defend himself
in the event of failure. Thus, he is more willing to invest his effort.
If any one of the assumptions does not hold, we can still have other
equilibria given any set of parameters. For all the equilibria, it is true
that if y = 0 and z = d1, P promotes W, and if y = 0 and z = d2, P
retains M. We can categorize those equilibria into four types, according to
the strategies of P when he does not have additional information about
the team’s composition, i.e., either he blocks the communication if the
output is high or the information does not successfully reach P when the
output is low. The first case results in the retention of M regardless of the
composition. As has been argued by Friebel and Raith (2004), the bad
M then will never have incentive to recruit a good W since a better W
only threatens his current position, which leads to a maximum abuse of
authority. Second, there is an equilibrium in which P always hires a new
M from outside, irrespective of the output. Both types of M will not have
any incentive to hire good W, since the bad M will always be fired anyway
and the possibility of retention for good M is too small comparing with the
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effort he needs to put in to be retained, which leads to a maximum level
of shirking. Third, there is an equilibrium in which P hires a new M when
y = 1 but retains M when y = 0. In this case, P provides M with opposite
incentives in the sense that P punishes M in good state but rewards him in
bad state, which seems unreasonable. Last, we also have equilibria in which
P promotes M upon observing y = 0 or y = 1. As also being mentioned
by Friebel and Raith (2004), such equilibria are economically unrealistic,
since the quality of the second-period M totally relies on the hiring decision
made by the first-period M.
Given the equilibrium strategies of P and M, we can characterize the
expected equilibrium profit of the firm.
Proposition 3.2 Under the assumption of Proposition 3.1, the firm’s ex-
pected equilibrium profit is increasing and convex in φ.
Notice that if communication is closed, M will be fired as long as the
output is low. Given the equilibrium strategy of P and the choice of M,
we observe that open communication has four positive effects on the firm’s
profit for which the first two are direct effects. First, if both M and W
are good but output is low due to bad luck, P could find out the truth
and retain the good M in the second period. Second, if the low output is
due to the incompetency of M and W is indeed better than him, P could
successfully promote the good W instead of hiring a new M from outside
and thus, have a good M for certain in the second period. Third, the more
open the communication, the higher the incentive for a good M to hire a
good W, thus, indirectly increasing the total profit of P. Lastly, there is also
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other direct positive benefit related to open communication captured by the
parameter ω. Therefore, we have arrived at the following proposition.
Proposition 3.3 Suppose the assumptions of Proposition 3.1 hold. Then
pi(1) > pi(φ), i.e., completely open communication is more profitable than
complete enforcement of a chain of command, and is also more profitable
than any other degree of partial open communication.
From our Assumption 3.1, i.e., qgg − qgb > qbg, we can see that the
probability for good M to obtain a higher output level when he hires a
good W is much higher than that when he hires a bad one. In order to
maximize the firm’s benefit, P would like to give extra incentives to good M
to make sure that the W he hired is good in the first period. In addition, P
would like to retain the good M in the second period, since the probability
to achieve high-level output is much higher when M is good than in the case
of a bad M according to the monotonicity property. The formal objective is
achieved in the form of protection of good M when the team’s composition
is (g,g). In this case, the good M will have incentive to spend more effort
to look for a good W, because he knows that even if he gets unlucky that
the output level turns out to be low, he is still able to defend himself and
secure his job in the second period. In other words, the extra amount of
effort he spent in order to get a good W will not be wasted. The latter
objective can also be achieved in the same form under a completely open
communication since P could single out (g,g) from other combinations and
retain the good M. If a chain of command is implemented, the good M will
lose the protection and will be more careful to weigh the cost and benefit
63
when hiring W. It may turn out that the effort he spends in choosing good
W becomes smaller. On the other hand, P will fire M as long as the output
is low, thus, losing some opportunity to retain the good M.
Here, someone may argue again that it might be even better to consider
the report (g,b) from the good M and retains him in the second period,
so as to enhance the benefit of open communication, especially in terms
of achieving the second objective. As we have explained earlier, the good
M will be more likely to shirk when he looks for a worker in the first
period. It is M’s responsibility to make recruitment. If the W he hired is
bad, he deserves some form of punishment. Furthermore, we can see that
even if we do not incorporate this case in P’s policy, the benefit of open
communication is already enough to prove its dominance.
In Friebel and Raith (2004)’s result, good M does not care about the
openness of communication, thus, closed communication only serves as a
purpose to protect bad M. Our case is a contrary, i.e., it is the bad M who
does not care about the openness of communication and communicating
freely is a way to protect good M. Even if the bad M gets fired when P
receives report from a good W under open communication, it does no more
harm to him than a chain of command, since he will be fired anyway if
output is bad. Also, Assumption 3.3 tells us that if the bad M hires a good
W, the probability for a good output is much higher than that for a low
one. Thus, based on the protection provided by P and the difference in
probabilities, the bad M already has much incentives to hire good W.
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3.4 Other Optimal Policies for the Principal
In reality, we often observe manager’s easy access to the principal. However,
whether to allow workers to have a similar access still remains discussion.
Here, we would like to analyze other possible policies for the principal while
preserving the fact that manager can always successfully communicate with
the principal if he wants to. It is assumed that manager chooses to com-
municate if and only if the team’s composition is (g,g), for the reason being
mentioned earlier, i.e., he wants to be identified if he is good and he has
also done a good job in looking for a good worker.
Here are the three other possible types of policies:
First type:
(a) If z = d1, P promotes W, who subsequently hires a new W.
(b) If z = d2, P retains M and M retains W.
(c) If z = c,
(i) If y = 0, a new M is hired from outside and M decides whether to
retain W.
(ii) If y = 1, P retains M and M decides whether to retain W.
Second type:
(a) If z = d2, P retains M and M retains W.
(b) If z , d2,
(i) If y = 1, no communication is allowed, and P retains M and M
decides whether to retain W.
(ii) If y = 0,
1) If z = d1, P promotes W, who subsequently hires a new W.
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2) If z = c, a new M is hired from outside and M decides whether
to retain W.
Third type:
(a) If z = d2, P retains M and M retains W.
(b) If z , d2,
(i) If y = 1,
1) If z = d1, P promotes W, who subsequently hires a new W.
2) If z = c, P retains M and M decides whether to retain W.
(ii) If y = 0, no communication is allowed, and a new M is hired from
outside and M decides whether to retain W.
The first type of equilibrium policy, if exists, is quite similar to the
one derived by Friebel and Raith (2004). The assumption qgg = 1 in their
paper rules out some ambiguity from the case when y = 0, so that a good
M is always retained if he hires a good W. Thus, their policy has the same
effect as the case where direct reporting is always possible between M and
P. The optimal strategies chosen by the good M and bad M are also the
same as those have been described by Friebel and Raith (2004). Therefore,
we speculate that the communication policy should also be similar.
The second type of equilibrium policy, if exists, leads to the optimal
choice of good M and bad M similar to our earlier results when commu-
nication is completely open. In fact, good M is retained if he can defend
himself when y = 0, which has been assumed being always possible here.
On the other hand, bad M is retained only if the output is high. Thus,
manager’s choice is not affected by the communication policy.
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The third type of equilibrium policy is not commonly seen within a firm.
The principal may not care too much about who contributes the most to
the project if it is a success, since it is either largely due to manager’s
own capability or his good effort in hiring a suitable worker. On the other
hand, a wise principal does not always fire his employees without giving
them a chance to defend if a project fails. According to this policy, if
communication is closed, P hires a new M when y = 0 and retains M
when y = 1. A good M will be retained as long as he hires a good W. If
communication is open, the third policy leads to the same policy claimed
by Friebel and Raith (2004) except when y = 0 and z = d1. In their work,
good W will be promoted as long as the information that he is better than
M has successfully reached P, regardless of the output level. Therefore,
P can definitely have a good M in the next period. In the third policy
described in this work however, M is always replaced from outside if y = 0
since no communication is allowed, and thus, P still faces some risk in the
second period that the newly hired M is bad. Therefore, the third policy
further dampens the incentives for open communication as less benefit is
provided, and reinforces the results obtained by Friebel and Raith (2004).
3.5 Conclusion
In the real world, we could observe a strict restriction in communication,
a completely open environment, or some partial degree of openness in a
firm. While Friebel and Raith (2004) have shown the conditions under
which a complete chain of command is more profitable than a completely
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open communication, we have shed light on the other side of the story. In
this work, the manager’s fear of being replaced by his subordinate cannot
be mitigated by closed communication. In fact, he is protected in such a
way that he is retained as long as the output is good. The openness of
communication only affects good manager’s incentives since he is afraid of
being fired if the output, unluckily, turns out to be bad, even if he has put
in effort in looking for a good worker. Open communication provides him
with an opportunity to self explain in the event of bad luck, so as to be
retained in the following period by the principal.
The choice of an optimal policy largely depends on the characteristics of
each firm, namely, the relative difference in productivity levels of different
team combinations, the principal’s ability in hiring a good manager, and
more importantly, the personnel transfer doctrine adopted by the princi-
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Appendix A: Addendum to
Chapter 1
In this section, we are going to provide some additional results for the case
when agents’ efforts are perfect complements, i.e., y = min{θ1a1 , θ2a2} +  .
Assuming that each agent obtains private information (his type and his
partner’s type) before contracting, so that principal could design contract
based on agents’ reported types. By direct revelation mechanism, we focus
on truth-telling mechanism. The purpose is to show that if the principal
could design more powerful contracts, the drawbacks in the input moni-
toring (mainly wasted effort problem) may no longer exist in the comple-
mentary technology. We are going to look at two types of contract, one
in which the wage depends on the individual reported type, and the other
depends on the profile of reported types.
The timing of the game under this new setting is as follows:
1. Nature chooses the agents’ productivity types, (θ1 , θ2). Each agent ob-
serves his own type as well as the other agent’s type.
2. The principal offers each agent a (common) menu of input-based con-
tracts that are contingent on declared types. An agent’s wage de-
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pends on the principal’s verifiable report of the agent’s input and the
type reported by the agent if it is a case of individual monitoring or
the report pairs if the principal opts for joint reports.
3. Each agent publicly declares his type t (or k) as h (high) or l (low)
(the lower case denoting the declared type) and signs the contract, if
the contract guarantees at least his reservation utility (normalized to
zero).
4. The agents choose their effort levels and produce output for the com-
plementary production technology, and the efforts are revealed to the
principal.
5. Wages are paid according to the signed contracts.
While we allow the wages to depend on both agents’ type reports, what
our principal will not do is to ask the agents to declare also the other agent’s
type. This is not to say that such a mechanism will not be more potent
theoretically (from the principal’s point of view), but in most organizations
such a (direct) reporting scheme (of the other agent’s type) that in turn
influences a worker’s own wage will be considered rather unusual even when
it involves team-based work.
 Input Monitoring: Individual Report.
Suppose the principal offers Wt (a j ) if the reported type is t = h, l as
follows:
Wt (a j ) = αta j + βt , where αt > 0, βt ≥ 0.
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, where t = h or l based on his reported type.




+ βt > 0,
satisfying individual rationality condition.
Note that if the input based contract depends only on individual report,
then the agent’s payoff only depends on his reported type. Thus, we could
derive the following incentive compatibility condition.
Lemma A.1 (Incentive Compatibility in Individual Report) For truth-
telling equilibrium, the principal has to offer wages such that pih = pil.
Now, we can characterise the optimal strategy for the principal.
Proposition A.1 Suppose efforts are perfect complements. The optimal
input monitoring contract based on individual report should exhibit the fol-
lowing characteristics:
(a) if p > 12 , and
(i) If 1 < θHθL ≤
√
p(2−p)



























1−p2 ≤ θHθL ≤ (
2−p
1−p )







(iv) If θHθL > (
2−p
1−p )







(b) if p ≤ 12 , and
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(i) If 1 ≤ θHθL ≤ (
2−p
1−p )







(ii) If θHθL > (
2−p
1−p )







The detailed form of the optimal contract is included in the Appendix
B. Case (a) describes the situation when it is more likely for an agent to be
of low type. Here, when the principal perceives that the chance for any one
of the agents to be low productive is relatively high, he has no incentive
to give a too high hourly wage to the high type agent. As can be seen
from case (a)(i), this is true especially when the productivity of high type
agent is not so high comparing with that of low type agent, resulting in
no waste of effort. As the value of θH relative to θL increases, principal
has more and more incentive to increase the unit reward for the high type
agent with respect to that of low type agent. This is due to the fact that
if both agents appear to be high types, their marginal effort contributions
will be very large. Case (a)(iii) describes a case of pooling equilibrium.
In case (a)(iv), the difference in their productivity is even larger and thus,
principal even gives a higher per unit effort incentive to the high type agent
than that to the low type agent. When p increases, the difference in their
productivity increases significantly, and the principal is willing to give a
higher incentive to the high type agent, although at the cost of possibly
more wasted effort, in order to capture more profit when both agents are
of high type.
The result in case (b) follows similar arguments, except that now, the
possibility for the agent to be high type is large. This enhances the effect
described in case (a). All the equilibria involve (possible) waste of effort
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exerted by the high type agent, and the incentive for the high type agent
is at least the same as that of low type agent.
In the first chapter, when reporting of type is not possible, we have
shown that input-based wage is worse than output-based wage because
of the presence of wastage of effort. Now, after we introduce individual
report incentive contracts, the equilibrium still involves waste under certain
conditions. If the principal reduces the incentive for the high type agent in
order to eliminate the waste when both agents are of different types, this
will also bring down his profit when both agents are of high types. The
reduction of such expected profit is sometimes not negligible. Based on
this trade-off, it might be optimal to have some waste in the equilibrium.
Since the waste of effort is still present, suggesting inefficiency in this
mechanism, one way we are going to improve this situation is to introduce
a stronger wage mechanism in which the contract received by a particu-
lar agent not only depends on his declared type but also depends on his
partner’s declared type. In other words, the principal is now able to offer
contracts based on the joint reports of the agents. Thus, we are able to
provide different incentives for the more productive agent according to his
partner’s report.
 Input Monitoring: Joint Reports. Keeping other things the
same, we will make slight modification of the model. Under joint reports
mechanism, the principal offers each agent the type of contracts specifying
the wages contingent on both agents’ declared types and the effort this
agent puts in. In other words, agent j will receive Wtk (a j ) if his reported
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type is t and his partner’s reported type is k. The wage is still linear in
agent’s effort, i.e.,
Wtk (a j ) = αtka j + βtk , αtk > 0, βtk ≥ 0.
Thus, agent j’s profit is




and he will choose a j =
αtk
d .








Note that the payoff for the agent does not depends on his true type
(his productivity), his partner’s true type (his partner’s productivity), but
depends on his reported type and his partner’s reported type. We can
derive the incentive compatibility constraints in similar forms.
Lemma A.2 (Incentive Compatibility in Joint Reports) For truth-
telling equilibrium, the principal has to offer wages such that pihh = pilh and
pill = pihl.
Since the joint report incentives provides more flexibility for the princi-
pal, we should expect him to obtain a higher profit, and the optimal joint
reports contract should have the following property.
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Proposition A.2 When the agents’ efforts are perfect complements, the
optimal input monitoring contract with joint reports incentives does not
involve waste of effort.
The idea is to show that under input monitoring joint reports incentives,
given any feasible mechanism that involves waste of efforts, the principal
can always construct a better mechanism which is feasible and does not
involve waste of efforts. Since the principal could now provide different
incentives for the high type agent according to his partner’s type, reducing
the unit effort wage for him when his partner is low type (in order to reduce
the waste of effort) will not affect his effort decision when his partner is
high type. Although the principal needs to increase his fixed wage in order
to satisfy the incentive compatibility condition, i.e., to make sure low type
agent has no incentive to report as high type when his partner is low type,
such increment in the cost is strictly less than what can be saved by reducing
the waste of effort. The detailed proof is in the Appendix B.
When the wage is non-discriminatory to both types of agents, it is shown
that when agents’ efforts are complements, input monitoring is inferior to
output monitoring because of the wasted effort problem. After a more
powerful form of contract is introduced, i.e., when wage is contingent on the
joint reports, such a problem in input monitoring no longer exists. The free-
rider problem may possibly put output monitoring at a disadvantage. As
what we have shown in chapter 2, input/contributions monitoring is strictly
better than output monitoring if the contract is based on the reported
profile of agents’ types.
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Appendix B: Proof
Proof of Proposition 1.1. When agents’ efforts are perfect complements,













{p(2− p)[1 − p(2− p)]θ2L + (1 − p)





{p(2− p)(1 − p)2θ2L + p(2− p)(1 − p)





p(2− p)(1 − p)2(θL − θH )2 > 0.
Thus, output monitoring is better than input monitoring for the prin-
cipal. Q.E.D.
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i.e., the expected profit for the principal is higher under input monitoring.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1.2. When agents’ efforts are substitutes, define




{(1 − 2p)(θH − θL)[pθL + (1 − p)θH ] + θHθL}.
Note that when p = 0, D = θ
2
H
4d > 0 and when p = 1, D =
θ2L
4d > 0. Now, we











Since ∂D∂p < 0 when p <
3θH−θL
4(θH−θL )
, as long as pmin ≥ 1, we will have D ≥ 0.
Equivalently, when θH ≤ 3θL, input monitoring generates higher expected
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profit for the principal. We have proven condition 1(a).







Thus, as long as the minimum value of D is above 0, input monitoring
is better. We know −θ2H − θ
2
L + 6θHθL ≥ 0 if and only if (3 − 2
√
2)θL <
θH ≤ (3 + 2
√
2)θL. Thus, input monitoring is better when 3θL < θH ≤
(3+ 2
√
2)θL. We have proven condition 1(b).
If θH > (3 + 2
√
2)θL, then −θ2H − θ
2
L + 6θHθL < 0, i.e., the minimum
value of D is below 0, we need to look at the horizontal intercept. When
D = 0,
p =
(3θH − θL) ±
√





Since D is a convex function of p, D > 0 if and only if
p <
(3θH − θL) −
√





(3θH − θL) +
√





We have proven conditions 1(c) and 2. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2.1. First, we can see that the payment function
pi (x , z^) = 0, ∀i, x , z^ and equilibrium contribution level yi ( z^) = 0, ∀i, z^
satisfy all the constraints. Let V˜ denote principal’s expected payoff under
such contract.
Next, we are going to show the existence of optimal solution.
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Since the domain of pi (x , z^) and yi ( z^) are finite, choosing the set of such
functions will be the same as choosing a finite number of vectors. Let V
be the space of n × mn × (1+ |X |) dimensional vectors which satisfy all the
constraints and give the principal’s expected payoff at least V˜ . Thus, each
element vk ∈ V can be represented as
vk (x , z^) = (yk ( z^), pk (x , z^))
= (y1k ( z^), y2k ( z^), ..., ynk ( z^), p1k (x , z^), p2k (x , z^), ..., pnk (x , z^)).
Step 1: Prove that the objective function is continuous on V .
This is trivial since the objective function only consists of simple arith-
metic operators, so the proof is omitted here.
Step 2: Prove that V is bounded.
Since there are finite number of output x and type profile z, there
always exists x¯ and z¯ such that U (x , z) ≤ U ( x¯ , z¯), ∀x , z. As pi (x , z) ≥ 0,
∀i, x , z, principal’s maximum possible expected payoff is U ( x¯ , z¯). Since
Pr(zi = θ j ) = qj > 0 ∀ j, there always exists a q
¯
∈ {q1 , q2, ..., qm} such
that qj ≥ q
¯
. Thus, principal will choose a payment function such that




n ∀i, x , z. Otherwise, his expected payoff will be strictly
smaller than V˜ . By LL(out), we know that pi (x , z) ≥ 0 ∀i, x , z. Thus, the
choice set of the function pi (x , z) is bounded.
Since c(yi , zi) → ∞ as yi → ∞, pi (x , z) is bounded uniformly by





n and 0 < f (x|y) ≤ 1, we have∑
x
pi (x , z) f (x|y) − c(yi , zi) → −∞ as
yi →∞. Thus, for every type profile z, there exists a value y¯i (z) such that
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pi (x , z) f (x|y)−c(yi , zi) is
the same as if it is solved with the addition of the constraint yi (z) ≤ y¯i (z).
Also, yi (z) ≥ 0 ∀i, z. Thus, given any particular value of z, the choice




pi (x , z) f (x|y) − c(yi , zi) is continuous in yi. Thus, the
maximizer(s) of this problem exists. Thus, the choice set of the function
yi (z) of the original problem is bounded.
Step 3: Prove that V is closed.
The proof is also trivial since all the constraints are weak inequalities.
Step 4: Prove the existence of optimal solution.
Since V is closed and bounded, V is compact. Since the objective
function is continuous on V , the optimal output monitoring contract ex-
ists. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2.1. Fix any feasible output monitoring con-
tract (p′(x , z^i , z^−i), y′( z^i , z^−i)). Consider the proposed contributions mon-
itoring mechanism with payment function p¯′i (yi , z^i , z^−i) and contribution
y¯′i ( z^i , z^−i) = y
′
i ( z^i , z^−i) ∀i. Since
∑
x
p′i (x , z^i , z^−i) f (x|y
′( z^i , z^−i)) − c(y′( z^i , z^−i), z^i) ≥ 0, ∀i, z^i , z^−i ,
we have ∑
x
p′i (x , z^i , z^−i) f (x|y
′( z^i , z^−i)) ≥ 0, ∀i, z^i , z^−i
Thus,
p¯′i (yi , z^i , z^−i) ≥ 0, ∀i, yi , z^i , z^−i ,
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i.e., LL(in) is satisfied.
Next, we show that under the proposed contributions monitoring mech-
anism, any agent’s equilibrium individual contribution and principal’s ex-
ante expected profit will be the same as that under the given feasible out-
put monitoring mechanism. Suppose other agents report truthfully. Given
the reporting profile ( z^i , z−i), principal asks agent i to contribute at least
y′i ( z^i , z−i) and rewards him
∑
x
p′i (x , z^i , z−i) f (x|y
′( z^i , z−i)).
If y′i ( z^i , z−i) is not met, the agent will get nothing. Assume that agent
i with ability zi truthfully reports his type. If he chooses to contribute
y′i (zi , z−i), his interim payoff is
pi′i (zi , zi , y
′
i (zi , z−i), z−i) =
∑
x
p′i (x , zi , z−i) f (x|y
′(zi , z−i)) − c(y′i (zi , z−i), zi).
If he contributes nothing, his interim payoff is 0. (Note that agent i has
no incentive to contribute more than y′i (zi , z−i) since doing so only in-
creases his cost but not his expected revenue. Also, he will not contribute
less than y′i (zi , z−i), if not 0, as his payment will always be 0). Since∑
x
p′i (x , zi , z−i) f (x|y
′(zi , z−i)) − c(y′i (zi , z−i), zi) ≥ 0, choosing y′i (zi , z−i) is
his optimal choice.
Since the principal is risk neutral, and he could induce each agent to
contribute y′i (zi , z−i) using the same amount of (expected) payment as that
under the output monitoring mechanism (p′(x , z^i , z^−i), y′( z^i , z^−i)), his ex-
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pected profit is the same as before.
Now, we are left to show that agent i with ability zi would truthfully
report his type. If the agent truthfully reports his type, his ex-ante expected
equilibrium payoff under contributions monitoring is
E−ipii (zi , zi , y′i (zi , z−i), z−i) = E−i[
∑
x
p′i (x , zi , z−i) f (x|y
′(zi , z−i))−c(y′i (zi , z−i), zi)].
If he reports his type as z^i , zi, his maximum ex-ante expected payoff is
E−i[max{p¯′i (y
′
i ( z^i , z−i), z^i , z−i) − c(y
′




p′i (x , z^i , z−i) f (x|y
′( z^i , z−i)) − c(y′i ( z^i , z−i), zi), 0}]




p′i (x , zi , z−i) f (x|y




p′i (x , z^i , z−i) f (x|y
′( z^i , z−i)) − c(y′i ( z^i , z−i), zi),
∑
x
p′i (x , z^i , z−i) f (x|0, y
′




p′i (x , z^i , z−i) f (x|y
′( z^i , z−i)) − c(y′i ( z^i , z−i), zi), 0}], ∀z^i.
Thus, the incentive compatibility constraints for truthful reporting is also
satisfied. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2.2. First, we know that the higher type should
earn no less than lower type, since the higher type can always mimic as the
lower type and earns at least the same as the lower type, because he has
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weakly lower cost. Thus, if the lowest type of agent i earns strictly positive
information rent, the higher type of him must also earn strictly positive
information rent.
Next, we are going to prove that it cannot be true that the lowest
type earns 0 information rent and any higher type earns strictly posi-
tive information rent. Suppose for a feasible output monitoring contract
(pi (x , zi , z−i), yi (zi , z−i)), there exists an agent i, such that the lowest type




pi (x , θ1 , z−i) f (x|y(θ1 , z−i)) − c(yi (θ1 , z−i), θ1)] = 0.




pi (x , z^i , z−i) f (x|y^outi (θ1 , z^i , z−i), y−i ( z^i , z−i))−c(yi (θ1 , z−i), θ1)] ≤ 0, ∀z^i , θ1.
Since pi (x , z^i , z−i) ≥ 0 ∀x , z^i , z−i due to LL(out), we have
∑
x
pi (x , z^i , z−i) f (x|y^outi (θ1 , z^i , z−i), y−i ( z^i , z−i)) − c( y^
out









pi (x , z^i , z−i) f (x|y^outi (θ1 , z^i , z−i), y−i ( z^i , z−i))−c( y^
out
i (θ1 , z^i , z−i), θ1) = 0, ∀z^i , z−i .
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Suppose there exists some x˜ , z˜i , z˜−i such that pi ( x˜ , z˜i , z˜−i) > 0 for which
z˜i , θ1. Thus, by putting in 0 contribution, the lowest type of him can get
strictly positive interim payoff, which contradicts to the above equation.
Thus, pi (x , z^i , z−i) = 0, ∀x , z^i , z−i, where z^i , θ1.
For agent i whose true type is z^i, given that pi (x , z^i , z−i) = 0, ∀x , z^i , z−i,
his best contribution level is 0, and thus, his interim and ex-ante expected
payoffs are 0. Thus, if the lowest type of agent i earns 0 information rent,
every type of him earns 0 information rent. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2.2. Take a feasible contributions monitoring contract
(p¯(yi , z^i , z^−i), y¯( z^i , z^−i)) which satisfies the proposed structure. Suppose
there exists an agent i with type z˜i such that all of his IC-type*(in) and
PC(in) constraints are non-binding, i.e.,
E−ipii ( z˜i , z˜i , y¯i ( z˜i , z−i), z−i) > E−ipii ( z˜i , z^i , y^ini ( z˜i , z^i , z−i), z−i),∀z^i , z˜i , and
E−ipii ( z˜i , z˜i , y¯i ( z˜i , z−i), z−i) > 0,
where y^ini ( z˜i , z^i , z−i) ∈ Y^ ini ( z˜i , z^i , z−i). Thus, there exists a particular type
profile of other agents zˇ−i such that agent i’s interim payoff is strictly




{E−ipii ( z˜i , z˜i , y¯i ( z˜i , z−i), z−i) − E−ipii ( z˜i , z^i , y^ini ( z˜i , z^i , z−i), z−i)},
which is the smallest difference between agent i’s expected equilibrium





min{δ, pii ( z˜i , z˜i , y¯i ( z˜i , zˇ−i), zˇ−i), E−ipii ( z˜i , z˜i , y¯i ( z˜i , z−i), z−i)}.
Consider the following contract:
p¯′i (yi , z^i , z^−i) =

p¯i (yi , z^i , z^−i) −  , i f ( z^i , z^−i) = ( z˜i , zˇ−i) and yi = y¯i ( z˜i , zˇ−i)
0, i f ( z^i , z^−i) = ( z˜i , zˇ−i) and yi , y¯i ( z˜i , zˇ−i)
p¯i (yi , z^i , z^−i), otherwise.
Under this new contract, only the payment to agent i is reduced by
a fixed amount  if the reporting profile is ( z˜i , zˇ−i) and agent i chooses
yi = y¯i ( z˜i , z−i). Now, check that under the new contract, LL(in) constraint
is still satisfied, i.e., p¯′i (yi , z^i , z^−i) ≥ 0. Since p¯i (yi , z^i , z^−i) is feasible by
assumption, p¯i (yi , z^i , z^−i) ≥ 0. Also,
p¯i ( y¯i ( z˜i , zˇ−i), z˜i , zˇ−i) − 
=p¯i ( y¯i ( z˜i , zˇ−i), z˜i , zˇ−i) −
1
2
min{δ, pii ( z˜i , z˜i , y¯i ( z˜i , zˇ−i), zˇ−i), E−ipii ( z˜i , z˜i , y¯i ( z˜i , z−i), z−i)}
≥p¯i ( y¯i ( z˜i , zˇ−i), z˜i , zˇ−i) − 1
2
pii ( z˜i , z˜i , y¯i ( z˜i , zˇ−i), zˇ−i)
=p¯i ( y¯i ( z˜i , zˇ−i), z˜i , zˇ−i) −
1
2




[p¯i ( y¯i ( z˜i , zˇ−i), z˜i , zˇ−i) + c( y¯i ( z˜i , zˇ−i), z˜i)]
>0.
Thus, the new contract p¯′i (yi , z^i , z^−i) satisfies LL(in) constraint.
Next, check that under this new contract, the equilibrium contributions
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for each type of the agent are still the same as that under the contract with
payment p¯i (yi , z^i , z^−i). Given p¯′i (yi , z^i , z^−i), only the incentive for type z˜i
agent if his partners are of type zˇ−i and he contributes y¯i ( z˜i , zˇ−i) is reduced.
Under p¯′i (yi , z^i , z^−i), if he contributes y¯i ( z˜i , zˇ−i), his payoff is
pi′i ( z˜i , z˜i , y¯i ( z˜i , zˇ−i), zˇ−i)
=p¯i ( y¯i ( z˜i , zˇ−i), z˜i , zˇ−i) −  − c( y¯i ( z˜i , zˇ−i), z˜i)
≥ 1
2




pii ( z˜i , z˜i , y¯i ( z˜i , zˇ−i), zˇ−i)
>0.
Thus, his optimal contribution level is still y¯i ( z˜i , zˇ−i). As incentives for
other type profile are not changed, the equilibrium contributions are not
changed for all the types.
In addition, we can easily check that PC(in) and IC-type(in) constraints
for agent i if his true type is z˜i are still satisfied, as by construction, the
reduction in payment is not big enough to alter his incentive in truthful
reporting and participation. If agent i’s true type is not z˜i, the previous
contract p¯i (yi , z^i , z^−i) ensures that he has no incentive to report as z˜i. Now,
in the new contract p¯′i (yi , z^i , z^−i), the ex-ante deviation expected payoff
becomes even smaller if he reports as type z˜i, which strengthens the validity
of his IC-type(in) constraints.
Therefore, the new contract p¯′i (yi , z^i , z^−i) is feasible and induces same
amount of contributions with less expected cost. Thus, principal’s ex-ante
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expected profit is higher with p¯′i (yi , z^i , z^−i). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2.3. We prove by contradiction. Suppose for a
given optimal contributions monitoring contract (p¯i (yi , zi , z−i), y¯i (zi , z−i)),
there exists an agent i such that the lowest type of him earns strictly
positive information rent. Thus, every type of agent i should earn strictly
positive ex-ante expected payoff, since the higher type can always mimic
as the lowest type, following the principal’s recommended contribution at
a weakly lower cost, and thus, earns a weakly higher payoff than the lowest
type’s equilibrium payoff.
Note that for the interim payoff, the following inequalities are always
satisfied:
pii (zi , zi , y¯i (zi , z−i), z−i) ≥ pii ( z˜i , zi , y^ini ( z˜i , zi , z−i), z−i) ∀i, z−i , if zi > z˜i,
(A2.1)
pii (zi , z˜i , y^ini (zi , z˜i , z−i), z−i) ≥ pii (zi , zi , y¯i (zi , z−i), z−i) ∀i, z−i , if zi > z˜i, and
(A2.2)
pii (zi , z^i , y^ini (zi , z^i , z−i), z−i) ≥ pii ( z˜i , z^i , y^ini ( z˜i , z^i , z−i), z−i) ∀i, z−i , if zi > z˜i.
(A2.3)
The first inequality says for each agent i, given any particular type pro-
file of other agents, the higher type of him can always obtain a weakly higher
interim equilibrium payoff than the interim deviation payoff of those lower
type who wants to mimic him. For example, pii (θ2, θ2, y¯i (θ1 , z−i), z−i) ≥
pii (θ1 , θ2, y^ini (θ1 , θ2, z−i), z−i). The second inequality says for each agent i,
given any particular type profile of other agents, when the higher type mim-
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ics a lower type, the higer type can always obtain a weakly higher interim
deviation payoff than the interim equilibrium payoff of the lower type. For
example, pii (θ2, θ1 , y^ini (θ2, θ1 , z−i), z−i) ≥ pii (θ1 , θ1 , y¯i (θ1 , z−i), z−i). The last
inequality says for each agent i, given any particular type profile of other
agents, the interim deviation payoff of higher type is always weakly higher
than that of the lower type if they mimic as some other type. For example,
pii (θ2, θ3, y^ini (θ2, θ3, z−i), z−i) ≥ pii (θ1 , θ3, y^ini (θ1 , θ3, z−i), z−i). These three
inequalities are due to the monotonicity of the cost function in type.
Since the contract is optimal, by Lemma 2.2, for each type zi, at least
one of his IC-type*(in) must be binding, that is to say, at least one of his
ex-ante deviation payoff is positive. Choose the smallest positive ex-ante
deviation payoffs among all types zi and all reported types z^i, and denote
R to be such deviation payoff, i.e., R ≡ min
zi , z^i
{E−ipii (zi , z^i , y^ini (zi , z^i , z−i), z−i) :
E−ipii (zi , z^i , y^ini (zi , z^i , z−i), z−i) > 0}. For any particular type z^i, we know
that when other type zi reports as type z^i, either E−ipii (zi , z^i , y^ini (zi , z^i , z−i), z−i) ≥
R or E−ipii (zi , z^i , y^ini (zi , z^i , z−i), z−i) = 0. Suppose z¯i is the smallest type
with respect to a particular type z^i such that E−ipii ( z¯i , z^i , y^ini ( z¯i , z^i , z−i), z−i) ≥
R. Thus, for all types zi < z¯i, E−ipii (zi , z^i , y^ini (zi , z^i , z−i), z−i) = 0, and for all
types z′i > z¯i, we know that E−ipii (z
′




i , z^i , z−i), z−i) ≥ R. Consider
the following two cases:
Case (i) z¯i < z^i.
Since E−ipii ( z¯i , z^i , y^ini ( z¯i , z^i , z−i), z−i) ≥ R, there must exists some set of
payments p¯i ( y¯i ( z^i , z−i), z^i , z−i) and y¯i ( z^i , z−i) such that pii ( z¯i , z^i , y¯i ( z^i , z−i), z−i) >
0 and the expected sum of those interim deviation payoffs is at least R.
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Thus, it is possible to reduce those payments p¯i ( y¯i ( z^i , z−i), z^i , z−i) such
that the expected reductions in the ex-ante deviation payoff is R and for
those type z−i which the type z¯i agent initially has incentive to follow
the principal’s recommended contribution when meet with, the type z¯i
agent still has incentive to follow the recommendation after the reduc-
tion. Since z^i > z¯i, by equation A2.1, we know pii ( z^i , z^i , y¯i ( z^i , z−i), z−i) ≥
pii ( z¯i , z^i , y¯i ( z^i , z−i), z−i) ∀z−i. Thus, the expected reduction in the ex-ante
equilibrium payoff for type z^i agent is also R. Before reduction, we know
E−ipii ( z^i , z^i , y¯i ( z^i , z−i), z−i) ≥ R, so the ex-ante expected payoff for type z^i
agent is still non-negative after reduction, i.e., PC(in) is still satisfied.
Case (ii) z¯i > z^i.
Similarly, since E−ipii ( z^i , z^i , y¯i ( z^i , z−i), z−i) ≥ R, there must exists some
set of payments p¯i ( y¯i ( z^i , z−i), z^i , z−i) and y¯i ( z^i , z−i) such that
pii ( z^i , z^i , y¯i ( z^i , z−i), z−i) > 0 and the expected sum of those interim equilib-
rium payoffs is at least R. Thus, it is possible to reduce those payments
p¯i ( y¯i ( z^i , z−i), z^i , z−i) such that the expected reductions in the ex-ante pay-
off is R and the type z^i agent still has incentive to follow the principal’s
recommended contribution under truthful reporting. Since z¯i > z^i, by equa-
tion A2.2, we know pii ( z¯i , z^i , y¯i ( z^i , z−i), z−i) ≥ pii ( z^i , z^i , y¯i ( z^i , z−i), z−i) ∀z−i.
Thus, the expected reduction in the ex-ante deviation payoff for type z¯i
agent when reporting as type z^i is also R.
For all types zi < z¯i, initially E−ipii (zi , z^i , y^ini (zi , z^i , z−i), z−i) = 0, and
after the reduction in payment, those ex-ante deviation payoff is still 0.
For all types z′i > z¯i, intially E−ipii (z
′




i , z^i , z−i), z−i) ≥ R. By equa-
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tion A2.3, we know pii (z′i , z^i , y¯i ( z^i , z−i), z−i) ≥ pii ( z¯i , z^i , y¯i ( z^i , z−i), z−i) ∀z−i.
Thus, the expected reduction in the deviation payoff is R.
Do such reduction for each possible type z^i. Thus, we know that each
type’s ex-ante equilibrium payoff is reduce by R, and the payoff is still non-
negative. Also, for the ex-ante deviation payoff that is initially 0, it is still
0 after the reduction in payment; for the ex-ante deviation payoff that is
initially positive, it is also reduced by R after the reduction in payment.
Thus, every type’s IC-type*(in) is still satisfied.
Thus, we arrive at a feasible contribution monitoring contract which
generates a higher expected payoff to the principal (by maintaining the
same contributions level with a lower payment), contradicting to the fact
that the original contract (p¯i (yi , zi , z−i), y¯i (zi , z−i)) is optimal. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2.4. From Proposition 2.1, we know that the
optimal output monitoring contract can be replicated by a contributions
monitoring contract which generates same equilibrium contribution levels
and same expected payoffs for the principal and the agents. By Proposition
2.2, we know that the for the optimal output monitoring contract, for at
least one agent, every type of him earns strictly positive information rent.
Thus, it is also true for the replicated contributions monitoring contract.
However, by Proposition 2.3, we know that for the optimal contributions
monitoring contract, the lowest type of every agent must earn 0 information
rent. Thus, the replicated contract is not optimal, that is to say, the optimal
contributions monitoring contract could generate a higher expected payoff
for the principal than the replicated contributions monitoring contract does,
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as well as the optimal output monitoring contract does. Q.E.D.
 The Proof of the main Claim in Vander Veen (1995). The pur-
pose of this note is to point out that while Vander Veen’s argument that
risk aversion should prompt the principal to prefer to monitor individual
contributions (over total team output) stands to economic reason, the au-
thor’s formal proof has a serious gap. We do not intend to fix this gap as
it is not integral to our main objective. We point it out here as we fail
to see if and how Vander Veen’s treatment of risk aversion could shed any
light on the optimal monitoring choice question when agents’ risk aversion
is replaced by limited liability constraints.
The reason one may want to make a connection between risk aversion
and limited liability is the following: In some sense, limited liability could
be considered as a specific instance of agent risk aversion with the utility
approaching negative infinity if their payments/rewards become too low.
But then not only one has to modify the linear utility functions in our
formulation (linear in monetary rewards) by concave segments near zero or
negative rewards, one also has to ensure that this local concavity is enough
to guarantee the dominance of individual contributions monitoring over
output monitoring. Below we identify the gap in Vander Veen’s proof.
Let us start with the statement of Vander Veen’s claim (stated exactly
as it appeared in the article):
Claim. Let pi (x(y, zˆ) be the McAfee and McMillan payment function which
is nonconstant. If the agents are risk averse, and total output is an insufficient
statistic for the individual contributions, then there exists a new sharing rule
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with monitoring of individual contributions which is Pareto improving.
The benchmark of McAfee and McMillan’s payment function pi (x(y, zˆ)
cannot be accurate. Instead, it should be the optimal contract under output
monitoring when agents have risk aversion. Let us therefore assume that
the pi (x(y, zˆ) function in the above claim is the optimal contract under
risk aversion.
Let us now return to our main concern. For his domination argument,
the author defines a new payment rule as follows (see p. 1055 of Vander
Veen’s article):
p˜(y, zˆ) = p(y, zˆ) + I11(y)ds11 + I12(y)ds12 + I2(y)ds2
and p˜z^ = k where k ∈ R is a constant,
Ii, j = 1 if y ∈ {y11 , y12},
0 otherwise
and ds11 , ds12, and ds2 are chosen appropriately.
The author’s restriction that p˜z^ = k is saying that the newly constructed
payment function is linear in agent types ( zˆ denoting the type profile).
Later on in his proof the author uses the property that pz^ = k ∀X j (see
p. 1056), which suggests that the author will have to restrict the payment
function p(x(y), zˆ) to be linear in types.18 But then such linearity has
to be the property of the optimal payment function under risk aversion
that is being dominated. Without establishing such property explicitly, it
18Note that the author had started out with the linearity restriction on p˜(y, zˆ), then
switched to p(x(y), zˆ).
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is unclear how the author can simply impose this restriction. This leaves
one to doubt how the author’s argument can be taken to apply to the
original optimal payment function under risk aversion, which the author
never derives explicitly.
Besides the above concern, the other reason we consider Vander Veen’s
risk aversion argument cannot apply to our setting is, he seems to be using
global risk aversion. 
Proof of Proposition 3.1. We adopt similar notations as in the proof of
Friebel and Raith (2004)’s paper. Let αg denote the probability chosen by
a good M while recruiting W and αb denote the probability chosen by a
bad M while recruiting W. We first assume that αg ≥ αb. Later, we show
that αg ≥ αb must hold in our equilibrium of the game.
Let p1 = (α0αg , α0(1−αg), (1−α0)αb, (1−α0)(1−αb)), q = (qgg , qgb, qbg , qbb).
Thus, p1 is P’s prior belief about the team’s composition and q is the team’s
technology.
To simplify the notation, if Pr (M = g) = a and Pr (W = g) = b,
sometimes we use notation [a, b] ≡ (ab, a(1− b), (1− a)b, (1− a)(1− b)) to
denote P’s belief about the team’s composition.
First, we characterize P’s best response.
(a) If y = 1, no communication is allowed. P’s belief upon knowing the
output level 1 is
t 1(p1) = 1p1·q (α0αgqgg , α0(1−αg)qgb, (1−α0)αbqbg , (1−α0)(1−αb)qbb).
Define A ≡ α0αgqgg, B ≡ α0(1 − αg)qgb, C ≡ (1 − α0)αbqbg, D ≡
(1 − α0)(1 − αb)qbb.
97
Thus, if P retains M, his updated belief is
tr (t 1(p1)) = 1p1·q (A+ α0B, (1 − α0)B,C + α0D, (1 − α0)D).
If P promotes W, his updated belief is
tp(t 1(p1)) = [ 1p1·q (A+ C), α0].
If P hires a new M, his updated belief is
th(t 1(p1)) = [α0, 1p1·q (A+ C + α0(B + D))].
P will make decision based on the expected second-period payoff, i.e.,
he will compare tr (t 1(p1)) · q, tp(t 1(p1)) · q and th(t 1(p1)) · q. Since they
all have the same denominator p1 · q > 0, we only need to compare the
numerators.
Retaining is preferred to promoting if [A+ α0B− α0(A+C)]qgg + [(1−
α0)B− (1− α0)(A+C)]qgb+ [C+ α0D− α0(B+D)]qbg + [(1− α0)D− (1−
α0)(B + D)]qbb > 0, which is equivalent to
[(1 − α0)A+ α0B]µ+ B(qgb − qbb + α0qbb) + [(1 − α0)Aqbg − α0Cqgg]
+ C[qbg − (1 − α0)qgb] > 0. (A3.1)
Note that (1 − α0)Aqbg − α0Cqgg > 0. Thus, by Assumption 3.4, i.e.,
qbg > (1 − α0)qgb, (A3.1) is valid.
Retaining is preferred to hiring if [A+α0B−α0(A+C+α0(B+D))]qgg+
[(1− α0)B− α0(1− α0)(B+ D)]qgb+ [C + α0D− (1− α0)(A+C + α0(B+




Note that (1 − α0)(A + α0B) − α0(C + α0D) = α0(1 − α0)(αgqqq −
αbqbg) + α20(1 − α0)[(1 − αg)qgb − (1 − αb)qbb], and (1 − α0)B − α0D =
α0(1 − α0)[(1 − αg)qgb − (1 − αb)qbb]. Thus, since αg > αb and qgg > qbg,
as long as (1 − αg)qgb > (1 − αb)qbb, the inequality (A3.2) is valid.
For simplicity, we can assume qbb = 0. Or else, when we substitute in
the optimal values of αg and αb (obtained later), the condition (1−αg)qgb >




(b) If y = 0,
(i) If z = d1, i.e., W reports (b,g),
if P retains M, his updated belief is tr (td1 (t0(p1))) = [0, 1];
if P promotes W, his updated belief is tp(td1 (t0(p1))) = [1, α0];
if P hires a new M, his updated belief is th(td1 (t0(p1))) = [α0, 1].
Since [1, α0] · q > [α0, 1] · q > [0, 1] · q, P should promotes W.
(ii) If z = d2, i.e., M reports (g,g),
if P retains M, his updated belief is tr (td2 (t0(p1))) = [1, 1];
if P promotes W, his updated belief is tp(td2 (t0(p1))) = [1, α0];
if P hires a new M, his updated belief is th(td2 (t0(p1))) = [α0, 1].
Since [1, 1] · q > [1, α0] · q > [α0, 1] · q, P should retain M.
(iii) If z = c, P’s updated belief is
t0(p1) = 1S (α0αg (1 − qgg)(1 − φ), α0(1 − αg)(1 − qgb), (1 − α0)αb(1 −
qbg)(1 − φ), (1 − α0)(1 − αb)(1 − qbb)),
where S ≡ α0αg (1− qgg)(1− φ)+α0(1−αg)(1− qgb)+ (1−α0)αb(1−
qbg)(1 − φ) + (1 − α0)(1 − αb)(1 − qbb).
For simplicity, define A′ ≡ α0αg (1−qgg)(1−φ), B′ ≡ α0(1−αg)(1−qgb),
99
C′ ≡ (1 − α0)αb(1 − qbg)(1 − φ), D′ ≡ (1 − α0)(1 − αb)(1 − qbb).
Thus, if P retains M, his updated belief is
tr (tc(t0(p1))) = 1S (A
′ + α0B′, (1 − α0)B′,C′ + α0D′, (1 − α0)D′).
If P promotes W, his updated belief is
tp(tc(t0(p1))) = [ 1S (A
′ + C′), α0].
If P hires a new M, his updated belief is
th(tc(t0(p1))) = [α0, 1S (A
′ + C′ + α0(B′ + D′))].
Since tr (tc(t0(p1))) ·q, tp(tc(t0(p1))) ·q and th(tc(t0(p1))) ·q have the same
denominator S > 0, similarly, we only need to compare the numerators.
Hiring is preferred to retaining if [α0(A′ + C′ + α0(B′ + D′)) − (A′ +
α0B′)]qgg+[α0(1−α0)(B′+D′)− (1−α0)B′]qgb+[(1−α0)(A′+C′+α0(B′+
D′)) − (C′+ α0D′)]qbg + [(1− α0)2(B′+ D′) − (1− α0)D′]qbb > 0, which is
equivalent to
[α0(C′ + α0D′) − (1 − α0)(A′ + α0B′)](qgg − qbg)
+(1 − α0)[α0D′ − (1 − α0)B′](qgb − qbb) > 0. (A3.3)
Note that α0D′− (1−α0)B′ = α0(1−α0)[(1−αb)(1− qbb)− (1−αg)(1−
qgb)] > 0,and α0(C′+α0D′)− (1−α0)(A′+α0B′) = α0(1−α0)(1−φ)[αb(1−
qbg)− αg (1− qgg)] + α20(1− α0)[(1− αb)(1− qbb)− (1− αg)(1− qgb)]. Thus,
as long as αb(1 − qbg) − αg (1 − qgg) > 0, (A3.3) is valid.
Once we substitute in the optimal value of αg and αb(obtained later),
the condition αb(1 − qbg) − αg (1 − qgg) > 0 is equivalent to (qbg − qbb)(1 −
qbg) − (1 − qgb)(1 − qgg) > 0, which is true if qbg − qbb > 1 − qgg.
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Hiring is preferred to promoting if [α0(A′+C′+α0(B′+D′))−α0(A′+
C′)]qgg + [α0(1− α0)(B′+ D′) − (1− α0)(A′+C′)]qgb+ [(1− α0)(A′+C′+
α0(B′+D′))−α0(B′+D′)]qbg+[(1−α0)2(B′+D′)−(1−α0)(B′+D′)]qbb > 0,




Thus, a sufficient condition is α0(B′ + D′) − (1 − α0)(A′ + C′) > 0, or
equivalently, α0[α0(1− αg)(1− qgb)− (1− α0)αg (1− qgg)] + (1− α0)[α0(1−
αb)(1 − qbb) − (1 − α0)αb(1 − qbg)] > 0.
If α0 > α
0
g ≡ 2k1+δ(1−qgb )(rM−rW )2(k0+k1) , then α0 > αg > αb. The above
inequality is true.
Next, we consider M’s best response.
The manager maximizes his discounted second-period payoff, net of his
recruiting costs, that is
U (α) = rM − C(α) + δ{Pret (α)rM + [1 − Pret (α)]rW }
Given P’s strategy, the probability of retention is
Pret (αg) = αgqgg + αg (1 − qgg)φ + (1 − αg)qgb, and
Pret (αb) = αbqbg + (1 − αb)qbb.
Thus, for bad M, the only way for him to be retained is that the outcome
must be good.
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Maximizing U (α) with respect to α, we obtain
αg = min{




2k1 + δ(qbg − qbb)(rM − rW )
2(k0 + k1)
, 1}.




αb given the assumption that qgg − qgb > qbg.
Other possible equilibria:
If (A3.1)-(A3.4) are not all satisfied, we will have different equilibria
results. The strategies of P when y = 0 and z = c, and when y = 1 has
been described in Table A3.1.
Table A3.1 Characterization of Equilibrium Outcomes
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Conditions Satisfied P’s Action
(A3.1) (A3.2) (A3.3) (A3.4) y = 1 y = 0, z = c
Yes Yes Yes Yes Retain Hire
Yes Yes Yes No Retain Promote
Yes Yes No Yes Retain Retain
Yes No Yes Yes Hire Hire
Yes Yes No No Retain Retain or Promote
Yes No Yes No Hire Promote
Yes No No Yes Hire Retain
Yes No No No Hire Retain or Promote
No Yes Yes Yes Promote Hire
No Yes Yes No Promote Promote
No Yes No Yes Promote Retain
No No Yes Yes Promote or Hire Hire
No Yes No No Promote Retain or Promote
No No Yes No Promote or Hire Promote
No No No Yes Promote or Hire Retain
No No No No Promote or Hire Retain or Promote
In general, there exists five types of equilibria that differ in P’s strategy
when the information of the team’s type is absent: first, the one stated
in Proposition 3.1; second, one in which P always retains M regardless of
output; third, one in which P always hires a new M from outside irrespective
of output; fourth, equilibrium in which P hires a new M when y = 1 but
retains M when y = 0; and fifth, equilibria in which P promotes W if either
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y = 0 or y = 1 or both. The second type leads to maximum abuse of
authority, the third type provides no incentive for M to hire good W, and
the fourth and fifth do not make much economical sense. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3.2.
We consider P’s decision.
The firm’s expected profit is
pi = p1 · q + δE(p2) · q + (1 + δ)ωφ − (1 + δ)(rM + rW ).
In equilibrium, the firm’s ex-ante expected composition of the (M,W)
team after the first period is
E(p2) = (p1 · q)tr (t 1(p1))
+(1 − α0)αb(1 − qbg)φtp(td1 (t0(p1)))
+α0αg (1 − qqq)φtr (td2 (t0(p1)))
+[1 − p1 · q − (1 − α0)αb(1 − qbg)φ − α0αg (1 − qqq)φ]th(tc(t0(p1))).
The firm’s expected profit can be expressed in the form pi = K1 +
K2αg (φ) + K3φαg (φ) + K4φ where
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K1 = α0qgb + (1 − α0)αbqbg (1 + qbg) + (1 − α0)(1 − αb)qbb − (1 + δ)(rM + rW )
+δ{α0(1 − α0)2[(1 − αb)(1 − qbb)(qgb + qbg) + (1 − qgb)qbb]
+α20(1 − α0)[(1 − αb)(1 − qbb)qgg + (1 − qgb)(qgb + qbg)]
+α0(1 − α0)[q2gb + (1 − αb)qbbqbg + αb(1 − qbg)qgg]
+α20qgg[qgb + α0(1 − qgb)]
+(1 − α0)2[(1 − αb)qbb(qbb + (1 − α0)(1 − qbb)) + αb(1 − qbg)qbg]}
> 0,
K2 = α0{(qgg − qgb) + δ(1 − α0)[α0(1 − qgb)(qgg − qgb − qbg + qbb)
+(1 − qgg)qbg + (qgg − qgb)(qgg + qgb) − (1 − qgb)qbb} > 0,
K3 = δα0(1 − α0)(1 − qgg)(qgg − qbg) > 0,
K4 = (1 + δ)ω + δ(1 − α0)2αb(1 − qbg)(qgb − qbg) > 0,
and K1 through K4 are independent of φ and αg.
Here, K2 > 0 since qgg − qgb > qbb according to Assumption 3.1 and
qgg + qgb > 1 − qgb according to Assumption 3.3. Differentiate pi(φ, αg (φ))




∂φ +αg (φ))+K4. Since K2,
K3, K4 > 0 and αg is weakly increasing in φ according to Proposition 3.1,





∂φ > 0, thus, pi is convex in φ. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3.3. The result immediately follows from Propo-
sition 3.2 as pi is increasing in φ. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Lemma A.1. Note that the profit for the agent does not depends
on his true type (his productivity), his partner’s true type (his partner’s
productivity) and his partner’s reported type, but only depends on his
reported type. If pih > pil , both agents will declare as high type no matter
what their true types are. If pih < pil , both agents will declare as low type no
matter what their true types are. Therefore, to ensure truthful reporting,
the principal has to design contracts such that both types of agents are
indifferent between the two wages. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition A.1. Consider three different cases.
(1) The wage per unit effort designed for the high type agent is the same
as that for the low type agent, i.e., αh = αl = α.
This is the same as the case with no type reporting that we have ana-
lyzed before, so we omit the result here.
(2) The wage per unit effort designed for the high type agent is lower than
that for the low type agent, i.e., αh < αl .
Since the output depends on the minimum contribution of the two
agents and the high type agent has higher productivity, ideally, the princi-
pal would like the high type agent to put in less effort in order to reduce
the waste of his effort.
To make sure that pih = pil , the principal will choose the fixed component
such that βh > βl , and he can set βl = 0 to minimize his cost without















































[p2θLαl + (1 − p)2θHαh − (1 + p)α2l − (1 − p)α
2
h
+2p(1 − p) min{θLαl , θHαh}].
We can see that E[pip] is a concave function about (αl , αh). This guar-
antees a unique solution for a given set of parameter values. Since there is
a minimum function, we have to consider different cases:
(i) Suppose θLαl < θHαh, thus, min{θLαl , θHαh} = θLαl .



















In order to make sure that αl > αh and θLαl < θHαh, the following two
conditions need to be satisfied:
p(2− p)θL > (1 − p2)θH , (AA.1)
p(2− p)θ2L < (1 − p
2)θ2H . (AA.2)
If any one of these two conditions is violated, there will be no interior
solution for this case.
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θ2L + (1 − p)
3θ2H ].
(ii) Suppose θLαl > θHαh, thus, min{θLαl , θHαh} = θHαh.

























2(1+p) < 0, thus, αl < αh. This contradicts
to our initial assumption that αl > αh. Therefore, there is no interior
solution for this case.
(iii) Suppose θLαl = θHαh.




, then ∂αl∂αh =
θH
θL
. Substituting the value of αl , the principal will






[p2θH + (1 − p)2θH − 2(1 + p)αh
θ2H
θ2L
− 2(1 − p)αh + 2p(1 − p)θH ] = 0,
so αh =
θ2L
2(1 + p)θ2H + 2(1 − p)θ
2
L
θH and αl =
θ2H

















(3) The wage per unit effort designed for the high type agent is higher than
that for the low type agent, i.e., αh > αl .














































[p(2− p)θLαl + (1 − p)2θHαh − pα2l − (2− p)α
2
h].



















The following condition needs to be satisfied to ensure αh > αl :
(2− p)2θL < (1 − p)2θH . (AA.3)








Here, we can find out that conditions (AA.1) and (AA.3) cannot be
held at the same time. Thus, if both conditions (AA.1) and (AA.2) are
satisfied, the possible equilibria left are the ones in case (1), (2)(i) and
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(2)(iii). If condition (AA.3) is satisfied, the possible equilibria left are the
ones in case (1), (2)(iii) and (3). For all the other conditions, we need to
compare the contracts in case (1) and 2(iii).




































4d(1 + p)[(1 + p)θ2H + (1 − p)θ
2
L]




Therefore, principal’s expected profit under case (2)(i) is the highest
and the corresponding wage scheme results in a waste of effort for high
type agent.
































4d(2− p)[(1 + p)θ2H + (1 − p)θ
2
L]
{[p(1 + p)(2− p)3 + (1 − p)5
−(2− p)]θ2Hθ
2
L + p(1 − p)(2− p)




4d(2− p)[(1 + p)θ2H + (1 − p)θ
2
L]
{[p(1 + p)(2− p)3 + 2(1 − p)4
−(2− p)]θ2Hθ
2
L + p(1 − p)(2− p)
3θ4L}
> 0,
where the last inequality is due to the fact that p(1 + p)(2 − p)3 + 2(1 −
p)4 − (2 − p) > 0. Therefore, the principal’s expected profit under case
(3) is the highest and this wage scheme results in a waste of effort for high
type agent.




1−p2 ≤ θHθL ≤ (
2−p
1−p )
2, and we are going to compare prin-
cipal’s profit under case (1) and (2)(iii). Define ∆(θH ) ≡ [p(2 − p)θL +







. ∆(θH ) is continuous and differentiable in
θH . Thus, we have
∂∆(θH )
∂θH












= 2(1 − p){(1 − p)3 +
6(1 + p)θ2Hθ
4
L − 2(1 − p)θ
6
L





We can see that the function ∆(θH ) is always convex in terms of θH .
At the point when θH = θL, ∆ = 0. When θH =
√
p(2−p)










L < 0. Since ∆ is always convex






1−p2 , ∆ < 0. Note that this condition
occurs only when p > 12 . Thus, principal’s expected profit under case 2(iii)
is higher, and this wage scheme results in no waste of effort.
For the condition p(2−p)
1−p2 ≤ θHθL ≤ (
2−p
1−p )
2, note that p(2−p)
1−p2 ≤ 1 iff
p ≤ 12 . Thus, the first constraint is effective only when p > 12 . Oth-
erwise, we can write the condition as 1 < θHθL ≤ (
2−p
1−p )
2 and p ≤ 12 . At
the point when θH =
p(2−p)



















> 0 for all θH >
p(2−p)
1−p2 θL. Thus, ∆ > 0 when
p(2−p)








(1− 2p)θL ≥ 0 when p ≤ 12 . Thus, ∆ > 0 when 1 < θHθL ≤ (
2−p
1−p )
2 and p ≤ 12 .
Therefore, when p(2−p)
1−p2 ≤ θHθL ≤ (
2−p
1−p )
2, profit under case (1) is higher, and
this wage scheme results in waste of effort for the high type agent. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma A.2. If both agents are high types, to ensure that
truthful reporting is an equilibrium, the principal has to offer wages such
that pihh ≥ pilh. Similarly, if both agents are low types, truth-telling requires
pill ≥ pihl . If the two agents are of different types, then the conditions
pihl ≥ pill and pilh ≥ pihh have to be satisfied. Thus, in order to fulfill all
the constraints, the only way is to design contracts such that pihh = pilh
and pill = pihl . These conditions will guarantee that no one has incentive to
deviate from the equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition A.2.
Fix a feasible contract with the set of parameters (αhh , αhl , αlh , αll ) and
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(βhh , βhl , βlh , βll ) and without loss of generality, assume θLαlh < θHαhl ,
i.e., when the two agents are of different types, there is waste of effort
exerted by the high type agent. The case for θLαlh > θHαhl can be proven
in a similar way. Since this contract is feasible, incentive compatibility



























ll ) such that α
′
tk = αtk and β
′
tk = βtk for all t , k = h, l



















For the given contract, since alh =
αlh
d , ahl =
αhl
d and θLαlh < θHαhl ,


























hl = ylh = yhl . Also, as the effort incentives for
other type combinations are not changed, we have y′hh = yhh and y
′
ll = yll .
On the other hand, the wage given to the agents under the proposed
new contract is the same as the given contract except for that given to the
high type agent when his partner is low type, i.e., W ′hh = Whh, W
′
ll = Wll ,





























2d + βll . By construction, α
′
hl < αhl , so W
′
hl < Whl .
Therefore, the proposed new contract generates higher expected profit
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for the principal and involves no waste of effort. Thus, we can conclude
that the optimal contract should not involve waste of effort.
Q.E.D.
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